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铜川市人民政府关于印发国有土地上房屋征收与补偿暂行办法的通知

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铜川市人民政府关于印发国有土地上房屋征收与补偿暂行办法的通知

陕西省铜川市人民政府


铜川市人民政府关于印发国有土地上房屋征收与补偿暂行办法的通知

铜政发〔2012〕59号



各区县人民政府,市新区管委会,市政府各工作部门、直属事业机构:
  现将《铜川市国有土地上房屋征收与补偿暂行办法》印发给你们,请遵照执行。

  

铜川市人民政府
2012年10月8日
  


铜川市国有土地上房屋征收与补偿暂行办法


  第一条 为规范我市国有土地上房屋征收与补偿活动,维护公共利益,保障被征收房屋所有权人合法权益,促进城市建设顺利进行,根据国务院《国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例》及有关法律法规,结合我市实际,制定本办法。
  第二条 为了公共利益需要,征收本市国有土地上单位、个人房屋,对房屋所有人的补偿适用本办法。
  第三条 房屋征收与补偿工作应当遵循决策民主、程序正当、结果公开的原则。
  第四条 为了保障国家安全、促进国民经济和社会发展等公共利益的需要,有下列情形之一,确需征收房屋的,由市政府作出房屋征收决定:
  (一)国防和外交的需要;
  (二)由政府组织实施的能源、交通、水利等基础设施建设的需要;
  (三)由政府组织实施的科技、教育、文化、卫生、体育、环境和资源保护、防灾减灾、文物保护、社会福利、市政公用等公共事业的需要;
  (四)由政府组织实施的保障性安居工程建设的需要;
  (五)由政府依照城乡规划法有关规定组织实施的对危房集中、基础设施落后等地段进行旧城区改建的需要;
  (六)法律、行政法规规定的其他公共利益的需要。
  第五条 市政府负责全市房屋征收与补偿工作。市住建局是市政府房屋征收部门(以下简称市房屋征收部门),负责组织实施全市房屋征收与补偿工作。区县政府负责本行政区域的房屋征收与补偿工作。
  第六条 财政、公安、国土资源、住建、规划、物价、工商等市级部门各司其职,密切配合,共同做好国有土地上房屋征收与补偿工作。
  第七条 市房屋征收部门会同发展改革、财政、国土资源、规划等市级部门,于每年10月31日前,按照全市国民经济和社会发展规划、土地利用总体规划、城乡规划和专项规划、保障性安居工程建设及旧城区改建计划,编制下一年度房屋征收计划,报市政府审定。
  第八条 房屋征收项目实施前,市房屋征收部门要会同有关部门和单位,按有关规定,对拟实施的房屋征收项目进行社会稳定风险评估,形成评估报告,报市政府审定。
  第九条 房屋征收范围确定后,范围内的单位和个人不得实施下列不当增加补偿费用的行为。违反规定实施的,不予补偿。
  (一)新建、扩建、改建房屋;
  (二)改变房屋和土地用途;
  (三)领取工商营业执照;
  (四)分户和户口迁入;
  (五)住宅和非住宅房屋租赁;
  (六)其他不当增加补偿费用的行为。
  市房屋征收部门应当就前款所列事项,以书面形式通知公安、国土资源、规划、工商等部门暂停办理相关手续。暂停办理的书面通知应当载明暂停期限。暂停期限最高不得超过1年。
  第十条 市房屋征收部门应组织或委托房屋征收实施单位对拟征收区域内的房屋进行调查登记。调查登记包括:
  (一)被征收人基本情况;
  (二)征收范围内房屋的地址、权属、用途、结构、建筑面积等情况;
  (三)征收范围内房屋土地权属、用途、面积等情况;
  (四)被征收房屋装饰装修、附属设施、附属物情况;
  (五)未经登记建筑和临时建筑等情况;
  (六)被征收房屋出租、抵押、查封等情况;
  (七)被征收人拟选择的补偿方式;
  (八)征收范围就近地段房屋交易价格情况;
  (九)因房屋征收造成停产、停业损失等情况;
  (十)被征收人是否符合住房保障条件的情况;
  (十一)其他需要调查登记的情况。
  调查登记结果应当在房屋征收范围内向被征收人公布。被征收人对公布的调查结果有异议的,市房屋征收部门或房屋征收实施单位等调查单位应当进行核实。
  第十一条 市房屋征收部门拟定房屋征收补偿方案,报市政府。征收补偿方案应当包括下列内容:
  (一)征收范围和实施时间;
  (二)补偿方式;
  (三)被征收房屋类似房地产市场价格的预评估基数;
  (四)各类补偿、补助、奖励的标准;
  (五)用于产权调换房屋的数量、地点、面积、结算价格和购买标准等;
  (六)签约期限、过渡方式和过渡期限、搬迁期限和提前搬迁奖励期限;
  (七)需要明确的其他内容。
  第十二条 市政府在确定征收补偿方案前,履行下列程序:
  (一)组织有关部门对征收补偿方案进行论证后予以公布,征求公众意见,征求意见期限不少于30日;
  (二)及时公布征求意见情况和根据公众意见修改情况,公布期限不少于3日;
  (三)旧城区改建需要征收房屋,多数被征收人认为征收补偿方案不符合国务院《国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例》规定的,应当组织被征收人和公众代表召开听证会,并根据听证会情况修改方案;
  (四)房屋征收涉及被征收人50户以上的,须经市政府常务会议讨论决定。
  第十三条 市政府作出房屋征收决定前,组织国土资源、规划、住建等相关部门对征收范围内未经依法登记的建筑进行调查、认定和处理。认定为合法建筑和未超过批准期限的临时建筑给予补偿;认定为违法建筑和超过批准期限的临时建筑不予补偿。调查认定结果在征收范围内向被征收人公布。
  第十四条 市政府作出房屋征收决定前,建设项目单位或财政部门应将征收补偿资金足额拨付到市房屋征收部门专用账户。
  第十五条 市政府做出房屋征收决定时,市房屋征收部门需提交以下文件:
  (一)市发展改革部门出具的立项文件或确认的建设项目符合国民经济和社会发展规划的文件;
  (二)市规划部门出具的建设用地规划许可证或书面确认的拟征收项目范围用地符合城乡规划和专项规划定点的文件;
  (三)市国土资源部门书面确认的拟征收范围内土地用途符合土地利用总体规划要求的文件;
  (四)市房屋征收部门书面确认的拟征收范围的用途符合国务院《国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例》第八条规定的文件和拟征收项目的社会稳定风险评估报告;
  (五)拟征收范围的补偿资金足额到位,专户存储的证明;
  (六)符合法定程序的征收补偿方案。
  第十六条 市政府根据市房屋征收部门提供的房屋征收相关资料及征求公众意见后修改的征收补偿方案作出房屋征收决定,并在征收范围内发布公告。
  房屋征收决定公告应载明征收范围、征收补偿方案、行政复议、行政诉讼权利等。
  房屋被依法征收的,国有土地使用权同时收回。
  第十七条 被征收房屋和用于产权调换房屋的价值,由具有相应资质的房地产价格评估机构,按照住建部《国有土地上房屋征收评估办法》评估确定。房屋征收评估、鉴定费用按政府价格主管部门规定的收费标准执行,由委托人承担。
  第十八条 房地产价格评估机构根据《陕西省国有土地上房屋征收房地产价格评估机构选定办法》选定。
  第十九条 房地产价格评估机构必须入户对被征收房屋进行评估,通过实测记录、录相等方式取得相关资料,逐户出具评估报告。
  被征收人应当积极配合房地产价格评估机构开展评估工作。拒不配合的,自行承担相应责任。
  第二十条 房地产价格评估机构应当指派与房屋征收评估项目工作量相适应的足够数量的注册房地产估价师开展评估工作。
  房地产价格评估机构不得转让或者变相转让房屋评估业务。
  第二十一条 被征收房屋价值评估目的应当表述“为房屋征收部门与被征收人确定被征收房屋价值的补偿提供依据,评估被征收房屋的价值”。
  用于产权调换房屋价值评估目的应当表述“为房屋征收部门与被征收人计算被征收房屋价值与用于产权调换房屋价值的差价提供依据,评估用于产权调换房屋的价值”。
  第二十二条 对于已经依法登记的房屋,其性质、用途和建筑面积,一般以房屋权属证书和房屋登记簿的记载为准,房屋权属证书与房屋登记薄的记载不一致的,除有证据证明房屋登记簿确有错误外,以房屋登记簿为准。对于未经依法登记的建筑,应当以市政府组织的对该项目进行调查、认定和处理的结果为依据进行评估。
  第二十三条 被征收房屋价值评估时点为房屋征收决定公告之日。
  用于产权调换房屋价值评估时点应当与被征收房屋价值评估时点一致。
  第二十四条 被征收房屋价值评估应当考虑被征收房屋的区位、用途、建筑结构、新旧程度、建筑面积、楼层、朝向、配套设施等因素;被征收房屋已经装修的,应当出具单独的装修评估报告。
  第二十五条 房屋评估结果应当公示。房屋评估报告要逐户送达,送达回执存档保存。
  第二十六条 被征收人对评估报告有异议的,自收到评估报告之日起10日内,向作出评估报告的房地产价格评估机构申请复核,房地产价格评估机构应当在10日内出具复核结果并送达。
  第二十七条 被征收人对复核结果有异议的,应当在收到复核结果之日起10日内,向房地产价格评估专家委员会申请鉴定。房地产价格评估专家委员会应当自收到鉴定申请之日起10日内出具书面鉴定意见并送达。
  第二十八条 对被征收人的补偿包括:
  (一)被征收房屋价值的补偿;
  (二)因征收房屋造成的搬迁、临时安置的补偿;
  (三)因征收房屋造成的停产停业损失的补偿。
  对在规定搬迁期限内搬迁的被征收人,按征收项目制定的搬迁奖励办法给予奖励。
  第二十九条 市政府征收决定作出后,在规定期限内,被征收人应当与房屋征收部门签订房屋征收补偿协议。房屋征收补偿协议应当载明下列内容:
  (一)被征收房屋的地址、权属、建筑面积、用途、结构类型、楼层等;
  (二)补偿方式;
  (三)货币补偿金额、付款方式、付款期限、结算方式等;
  (四)用于产权调换房屋的地址、权属、建筑面积、用途、结构、楼层、差价、结算方式等;
  (五)搬迁期限、搬迁过渡方式、过渡期限、搬迁费、临时安置费等;
  (六)停产、停业损失等事项;
  (七)违约责任;
  (八)其他约定事项。
  房屋征收补偿协议文本格式由市房屋征收部门统一制作公布。
  补偿协议签订后,一方当事人不履行补偿协议约定义务的,另一方当事人可以依法提起诉讼。
  第三十条 实施房屋征收应当先补偿、后搬迁。
  对被征收人给予补偿后,被征收人应当在补偿协议约定或者补偿决定确定的搬迁期限内完成搬迁。
  第三十一条 被征收人可以选择货币补偿,也可以选择房屋产权调换。
  被征收人选择货币补偿的,市房屋征收部门应当向被征收人支付货币补偿费,并按被征收房屋评估价值的20%给予购房补贴。
  被征收人选择房屋产权调换的,市房屋征收部门应提供产权调换房屋。产权调换房屋为现房的,市房屋征收部门与被征收人计算、结清货币补偿费与产权调换房屋价值的差价;产权调换房屋为期房的,市房屋征收部门与被征收人计算货币补偿费与产权调换房屋价值的差价,在交付房屋时,结清差价款。
  第三十二条 签订房屋征收补偿协议后,被征收人应当将被征收房屋的土地使用权证、房屋所有权证等一并缴回,有关职能部门应当及时办理注销手续。
  第三十三条 公安、教育等相关部门,应按照各自职责支持房屋征收工作,及时办理被征收人因征收搬迁而造成的入户、子女入学转学等相关手续。
  第三十四条 市房屋征收部门与被征收人在征收补偿方案确定的签约期限内达不成补偿协议,或者被征收房屋所有权人不明确的,市房屋征收部门报请市政府,按照征收补偿方案作出补偿决定,并在房屋征收范围内予以公告。
  补偿决定作出后,市房屋征收部门应当会同被征收房屋所在地政府、街道办事处、居委会、社区和房屋征收实施单位共同做好宣传、解释和协调工作。
  第三十五条 补偿决定应当公平,包括补偿协议应具有的内容。
  被征收人对补偿决定不服的,可依法申请行政复议或者提起行政诉讼。
  第三十六条 被征收人在法定期限内不申请行政复议或者不提起行政诉讼,在补偿决定规定的期限内又不搬迁的,市政府依法申请人民法院强制执行。
  第三十七条 申请征收强制执行应当向人民法院提交以下资料:
  (一)强制执行申请书;
  (二)征收补偿决定及送达回执;
  (三)作出补偿决定的相关证据、理由及所依据的法规文件;
  (四)人民法院要求提供的其他材料。
  第三十八条 强制执行申请书应当附补偿金额和专户存储帐号、产权调换房屋和周转用房的地点和面积等资料,并载明以下内容:
  (一)申请执行人和被执行人的基本情况;
  (二)申请执行的标的物;
  (三)申请执行所依据的法律文书;
  (四)行政机关书面通知被征收人履行义务的情况;
  (五)其他应说明的情况。
  第三十九条 禁止采取暴力、威胁或者违反规定中断供水、供热、供气、供电和道路通行等非法方式迫使被征收人搬迁。造成损失的,依法承担赔偿责任。对直接负责的主管人员和其他直接责任人员,构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任;尚不构成犯罪的,依法给予处分;构成违反治安管理行为的,依法给予治安管理处罚。
  第四十条 采取暴力、威胁等方法阻碍依法进行的房屋征收与补偿工作,构成犯罪的,依法追究刑事责任;构成违反治安管理行为的,依法给予治安管理处罚。
  第四十一条 市房屋征收部门应当依法建立房屋征收与补偿档案,并将分户补偿情况在房屋征收范围内向被征收人公布。
  第四十二条 市房屋征收部门应当根据本办法制定具体的实施细则。
  第四十三条 本办法自2012年11月1日起施行,有效期为二年。




























长春市就业训练暂行规定

吉林省长春市人民政府


长春市就业训练暂行规定
 

(1994年11月22日 长春市人民政府令第28号)




  第一条 为加强企业训练管理,全面提高劳动素质,发展职业技术培训,以适应建立社会主义市场经济的需要,根据国家和省的有关规定,结合我市实际,制定本规定。


  第二条 就业训练是指根据用工单位和失业人员的需要进行的就业前职业技能培训。凡本市行政区域内各级就业训练中心及从事就业训练的单位和个人(以下简称就业训练单位)、用工单位及要求就业的失业人员均应遵守本规定。


  第三条 各级劳动行政管理部门是就业训练的行政主管部门。在就业训练管理中具有下列职能:
  (一)贯彻执行国家和省、市有关的就业训练法律、法规、规章及政策。
  (二)制定和落实就业训练规划和年度计划。
  (三)审查认定各类就业训练网点和劳动技能训练班资格。
  (四)实施对就业训练的监督、指导和管理。
  (五)对就业训练结业生进行考核和颁发证书。


  第四条 就业训练的基本任务是培养具有社会主义觉悟、有一定专业技能和良好职业道德的劳动者,综合开发城乡劳动力资源,为失业人员就业创造条件,为用工单位提供合格的劳动力。


  第五条 就业训练要坚持“先培训,后就业;先培训,后上岗”的原则,凡要求就业的失业人员均应进行与岗位相适应的劳动技能训练。培训期满,经考核合格取得《就业训练结业证》后,方可进行就业登记和办理就业手续或领取工商营业执照。


  第六条 就业训练班招收学员,实行面向社会、公开招收、自愿报名、自选专业、自费就学的原则。学员结业后,择优推荐就业。


  第七条 就业训练单位应根据经济和社会发展需要,确定就业训练规划,合理设置培训专业,采取自行办班、联合培训等多种办学形式,进行定向培训或委托培训。


  第八条 就业训练的培训对象:
  (一)要求就业的城镇失业人员。
  (二)需要改变职业的失业职工和需要改变岗位,或提高职业技术的企业富余人员。
  (三)需要掌握一定技术的自谋职业者。
  (四)经劳动行政管理部门批准从农村招收的工人。
  (五)乡镇企业新增职工和要求掌握一定职业技能的农村富余劳动力。
  (六)企业安排在生产岗位上的常年临时工和劳服企业安排的从业人员。
  (七)其他需要进行职业技术培训的人员。


  第九条 开办就业培训班,应具备下列条件:
  (一)有胜任培训工作的任课教师。专兼职教师要具备中专以上学历或中级以上专业技术职称,其中兼职任课教师还应持有关部门签发的讲课资格证书,实习指导教师必须具备中级工以上水平。
  (二)有与培训目标相适应的考核标准、教学计划、教学大纲,并采用部、省、市编印的专业教材;采用自编教材的,需经市就业训练行政主管部门批准。
  (三)有操作技能训练的实习场所或者定点挂勾的实习基地。


  第十条 开办就业训练班,应按隶属关系向同级就业训练行政主管部门提出申请。经审查批准后,方可办班。需刊播招生广告的,须经同级就业训练行政主管部门批准后,方可刊播。


  第十一条 就业训练要坚持思想教育与职工技术培训相结合的原则。主要培训内容应包括职业道德、法律常识、就业指导、安全生产教育、专业技术理论和实际操作、技能训练等,并以实际操作技能训练为主。


  第十二条 就业训练的培训目标为熟练工人和初、中级技术工人。简单劳动岗位上的熟练工人,培训期一般为三个月;一般技术岗位上的技术工人培训期一般为六个月;技术性较强工种(岗位)的技术工人培训期要在一年或一年以上。


  第十三条 需转换职业或岗位的失业职工和企业富余人员的培训内容及培训期可根据实际需要确定。


  第十四条 开办就业培训班,应到物价部门办理收费许可证,并按物价部门核定的收费标准收取培训费。


  第十五条 就业训练要坚持为企业用工服务和为求职人员服务的办学方向,努力改善办学条件,不断提高教师的政治、业务水平,改进教学方法,保证培训质量,使学员能真正掌握岗位技能,顶岗生产。


  第十六条 就业训练单位应加强学员的学籍管理。学员入学后,要建立学员档案。档案内容包括:学员登记表、学员名册、学习成绩、操行评语等。学员被招工录用后,应将学籍转给用人单位。


  第十七条 就业训练的结业考核,在市、县(市)、区就业训练主管部门指导下,由办班单位组织实施。考核合格者,由同级就业训练主管部门颁发全省统一的《就业训练结业证》。


  第十八条 经就业训练并考核合格,取得《就业训练结业证》的定向培训学员,可免于招工考试,直接办理录用手续。并可同时进行技术等级考核,合格者由劳动行政管理部门颁发《技术工人等级证书》,作为评定工资待遇的依据。


  第十九条 市就业训练中心自办的就业前训练的职业技能签定,受市劳动行政管理部门委托,可以按照有关规定由市就业训练中心自行考核发证。


  第二十条 各级就业训练中心的经费来源主要是:
  (一)就业经费中用于就业训练的部分。
  (二)主办单位扶持。
  (三)就业服务机构补贴。
  (四)生产经营收入。
  (五)收取的培训费。


  第二十一条 各级就业训练中心,可以结合教学开展生产经营活动,增加收入,改善办学条件。


  第二十二条 对在就业训练工作中做出显蓍成绩的单位和个人,由就业训练行政主管部门给予表彰和奖励。


  第二十三条 对违反本规定的单位和个人,由就业训练行政主管部门分别给予警告、限期整顿、公开批评、责令退赔、没收非法所得和处以非法所得额10%至200%的罚款,直至取消办学资格。


  第二十四条 本规定由市人民政府法制办公室负责解释。


  第二十五条 本规定由市劳动局负责组织实施。


  第二十六条 本规定自发布之日起施行。


Student:Dayong Zhou

dayong_77@hotmail.com


The Collectivizationa and De-collectivization in Rural China

周大勇 (Zhou,Dayong)

Abstract: the process of de-collectivization took place 25 years ago, however it was uncompleted, which determined that china has to make great effort to continue his rural reform, in order to liberate the peasant and the status of rural region as the Party promised. In China, the non-privatization reform occurred along with the de-collectivization was a uncompleted reform, which remains the defects of both collectivization and small-scale peasant economy, therefore it restricts the development of the rural society, however, the current system seems unable also reluctantly to change it. This paper intents to introduce the process of the collectivization and the most important rural reform in this century, namely the de-collectivization, the demonstrates the progression of de-collectivization, its characters as well as the problems left to be solve.
Keywords: collectivization De-collectivization collective ownership incomplete

Foreword
I am pleased that I am allowed to write the term paper about China. China was influenced by Marxism and walked in detour of history for half century. Before Marxism bankrupted in former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe countries, China had adopted a different way to reform from those countries. Because of the difference in aspects of historical evolution, political forms and natural environment, it’s hard to compare the rural society of China with these former socialism countries directly, also, the progression of collectivization and its end are different in two continents.
Rural china before collectivization
Collectivization was a mark system of the socialist state. Although in the era of Utopian socialism, Robert Owen for example has already attempted to set up the collective farm, but it wasn’t pursued by force strength of government. Even the founder of communism Marx didn’t agree that communism could be realized in undeveloped countries with extremely poor productivity . It was Russia, the serf country, in which Communist took power without adequate preparation; collectivization was implemented by force, in order to consolidate the rule in grass-root countryside. This experience has influenced China and Eastern Europe, because one of the merits of the collectivization lies in being easy to be managed, the other lies in being easy to deprive peasants.
China was a backward country, which suffered from ignorance and war for centuries. Throughout the centuries some 80 to 90 percent of the Chinese population were farmers and live in one of some 900,000 villages, which have an average population of from 1,000 to 2,000 people. Villages were not self-contained, self-sufficient units. Clusters of villages centered on small market towns, which linked them to the wider economy and society by providing not only opportunities to buy and sell but also opportunities for entertainment, information, social life, and a host of specialized services. The traditional Chinese elite, often referred to in English as the gentry dispersed across the country and often lived in rural areas, where they were the dominant figures on the local scene, normally ruled villages. Although they held land, which they rented to tenant farmers, they neither possessed large estates like European nobles nor held hereditary titles. However, they traditionally interpreted central policies and national values for villagers. As in feudal relationship, the peasants and gentry live depend on each other. Gentry provided land to poor peasants and tenant, and work with rich and middle peasants to secure the order in village, for instance opening school and building basic infrastructures to maintain there social status. In Chinese history, at the beginning of very dynasty, the land relationship between landlord and poor peasants were comparably fair, that meant, peasant have parcel farmland to live on. But land tended to be concentrated on end every dynasty, then there might be a peasant uprising led to a new dynasty and retribution of land. This is the basic clue of social evolution in China before communist period.
After the Chinese Communist Party came into power in mainland, it had to keep its promise, which it made during the period of war to encourage the peasant to join the army, that it would gave peasant their own land. The first major action took place from 1940s to early 1950s. June 1950, a new Land Reform Law of new People’s Republic was promulgated and stipulated nullification of the feudal land ownership system, and institutionalization of the system of land ownership by peasants, in which the Party sent agents to every village to carry out the land reform policy. This in itself was an unprecedented show of political power and the resolution of transform an old society. The reform was successful, because the peasants supported the policy; most of them had been waiting for the reform for long time. In the light of the reform law, land were redistribute from the landlords, land-owning trusts or wealthier families to the poor segments in the same village; village elites, who might be expected to go up against the Party and its programs were brought down; new leadership was established by poor peasants who showed the most loyalty to the party's goals; instead of kinship group or patron-client ties, class status became new relationship among villagers.
the process of Collectivization
However, the Party’s leaders were not satisfied with the privatization of land, at one hand, such ownership, according to the doctrine of socialism, should have been abolished in the state of socialism, at another hand, private ownership of small peasantry had no function of property accumulation for the country. At that time, in order to accelerate the construction of socialism, China had launched The First Five-Year Plan after the Soviet model; heavy industry development was profound stressed since the leaders of Communist Party regard socialist country as a country with developed industry sectors. However, the situation in early 1950s was not ideal for a new country. Pressing of needs for food in a country with burgeoning population, domestic capital for investment, and purchase of Soviet-supplied technology, capital equipment, and military hardware. To satisfy these needs, collectivize agriculture was put forward. Collectivization was regard as a method to turn countryside to stabile backing, which can be managed as semi-military and had rare contact with outside, so that the government could press the price of agricultural products by means of scissors difference between cities and countryside, and seize huge numbers of profit from agriculture economies to support the industrialization in city. At the same time, the government had already nationalized banking, industry, and even trade. Private enterprise was already virtually abolished in national wide.
Despite internal disagreement as to the speed of collectivization, preliminary collectivization was launched since 1952. China's peasantry saw Chairman Mao and the Communist Party as heroic much more than Russia's peasantry had seen Stalin and the Bolsheviks as heroes, and through 1956 the peasantry cooperated with the Party. There was none of the resistance and warfare that had accompanied the collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union.
The collectivization of agriculture was basically completed with the establishment of the people's communes in 1958. The People’s Commune system was defined as a unity of politics and production, in which all members of the commune jointly owned property. Essentially, the commune system was based on private contract of its members and the principle of voluntaries and mutual benefit, however, it turned out yet as coercive institutional arrangement, which was made by government with political power. In the movement to achieve the People’ s Commune, peasants had no choice whether or not to join.
Communes were designed as large, embracing scores of villages created by combining some 20 or 30 advanced producers' cooperatives of 20,000 to 30,000 members on average, in some cases the membership varied from as few as 6,000 to over 40,000. It was instituted as an organization with functions of the lowest level of local government and the highest level of organization in agricultural production. Communes consisted of three organizational levels: the central commune administration; the production brigade , and the production team, which generally consisted of around thirty families. This kind of institution was an organization of hierarchies, in which the commune acted as political unit and top manager, the brigades played role of co-coordinators between the commune and the basic production teams. The production team was basic units of production and accounting. Since the people’s commune system was a tool established to extract resources from agriculture sector for industrialization, as a result, it neglected peasants’ incentive completely. In order to let the people’s commune system run, the central government designed an relative effective mechanism to encourage managers in each hierarchy to work enthusiastically, yet, in each level, the managers were treated differently and there was a clear difference in aspects of identity and welfare between the managers of the commune and of the brigades or production teams.
The commune was defined as administrative organ and executed the central government’s orders, and paid from central government’s budget, therefore the managers in the level of commune were “state cadres” , that means they were formal governmental officials and got wage monthly. These state cadres could be promoted and became officials of governmental divisions in higher level. Brigades and production teams were collective economic organizations, their running expenses came from production teams’ tribute. Managers in brigades level were called “collective cadres” . They were remunerated in their own production teams according to their labor quotas. Their wage was paid in the form of products instead of money. Managers in production teams were“team cadres”, they were also members of the production team. They worked as peasant like their workmates, and were paid in products according to labor quotas. Team cadres could be promoted to collective cadres. Collective and team cadres had little possibilities to be promoted and became members of state cadres. Nevertheless, as collective and team cadres had some privileges. For example, collective managers had the power of assigning state’s delivery quotas and production tasks among production teams, they determined who could enrolled in state-owned factories, universities and army. The production team managers executed the power of assigning work and distributing products among collective members. Furthermore, in the period of many political movements and class struggles, the identity of cadre could protect their families, relatives and themselves from being denounced and bullied (Tan, 1999).
At beginning, the commune itself was decorated as the representation of socialist society and had all merits of public ownership. Although nearly all the private property had been deprived, peasants had to praise the new system profusely. it was true, most poor peasants found that their lives changed, by eating in the public dining they didn’t need to worry about their own budget anymore, and by working together, they were not necessary to try their best. Following propaganda appeared in newspapers everyday:
The public dining halls are distributed in a way that members need walk only a few minutes from their homes to take their meals. On the freshly whitewashed walls of the one on Shihfuchien Street, a typical establishment, there is a big slogan in red, which reads, "High Spirits for Higher Production!" Its kitchen, to which the visitor is drawn by the aroma of food and the clatter of pots, is managed by Tu Hsiu-chen, the first volunteer cook, who has since learned large-scale catering from the chef at one of the city's restaurants.
The walls of the spacious dining room are decorated with paintings, as a home might be. Its tables and chairs, though simple, are scrubbed to a shining cleanliness. The food is fresh and tasty -- vegetables are grown by the commune itself. The staff make a special point of studying the diet and preferences of old people, children, nursing mothers and members with ailments. There is a separate room for parents with small children, provided with low tables for the little ones.( People’s Daily, 1958)
However, in practice, this ideal, extremely centralized form commune didn’t keep running well in most areas. Very soon it became clear that in most cases the communes were too clumsy to carry out successfully all the managerial and administrative functions that were assigned to them. The cooperative led to low-efficiency, the advantages of large-scale productivity didn’t arrive as peasants anticipated, productivity began to drop and discontent emerged. The reason lies in insufficient utilization of resources and lack of incentive of peasants. At one hand, the output of cooperation comes from all members’ work, in which the tribute of single household is difficult to be measured. So that opportunism like shirking happened naturally very frequently. An effective way to prevent shirking is to have all members supervised, but the seasonal work and spatial diversity of agricultural productive activities make it difficult to totally supervise. At the other hand, although brigade and production team cadres were obliged to complete state’s planning and all kinds of deliveries, the control right and residual claim of the people’s commune system were in the state’s hand, these cadres at grass-level could not design any reasonable incentive mechanism to encourage peasants to work hard and produce according to reasonable natural condition, such as soil, irrigation and farm year. The way left for brigade and team cadres was to punish peasants by struggling against them or maltreatment. But the brigade and team cadres also belonged to members of production teams, they and their families lived in the same community with their subordinates as well, so punishing peasants could also make themselves in trouble. Moreover, under the property rights structure of the commune system, the rest of output was not belong to the commune, brigade or even production team, but to the governments of higher level. This made the supervisors’ effort unrelated to any reward. As a result, even the supervisor himself has not enough incentive to work and shirk himself sometimes. In a word, under such conditions of poor supervision, in which all the work was distributed equally among all members at the lowest level--production team, shirking became every member’s rational choice and further weakening the efficiency of the system (Lin,1990).
De-collectivization
To prevent peasants from slow down, shrinking and escaping in work, and assure the system could keep on moving, the party collected all productive equipments and forbid members in people’s commune engaging in private production and business on the one hand, and at same time deprived peasants’ right of migrating from countryside to city or between districts by means of household registration on the other hand. Nevertheless, such policies had no effect on improving incentive of peasants, but they formed at least political press on very member of people’s commune, because it turned out that everyone’s only routine is to stay in the commune and finish one’s task. Without the right to leave or get better than others, peasants commonly chose to work with little effort, e.g. a passive method, to evade production tasks assigned by leader. Little accumulation and shirking made countryside widely fall into poverty , rare rural region had good conditions to develop industry or to improve commerce, infrastructures went worse, productivity sank quickly. The most serious crisis for agricultural collectivization happened between 1959 and 1961. GNP decreased from 213.8 billion Yuan in 1958 to 180.0 billion Yuan in 1962, with an average annual reduction of 15.1% in gross industrial production value and an average annual reduction of 19.3% in gross agricultural production value from 1958 to 1960. Owing to the serious shortage of food, a great famine took place in the whole country and at least 30 million residents died (Tan, 2000). Discontent with such system broke out, in some areas, peasants didn’t want to relied so heavily on orders from above and made so little allowance for local conditions or local initiative. The severe crisis forced the Party to adjust their policies. From 1961 on, commune functions were reduced to administration and co-ordination, production team was confirmed as the basic unit of accounting, certain production decision making was delegated to production teams, which were allowed to retain some income to overcome problems of egalitarianism; households again allowed to have small private plots and sidelines for planting vegetables, and a limited opening markets for transaction between urban and rural areas. However, these adjustments didn’t mean to change the system of people’s commune, but only to prevent peasants from rebel. From 1966 to 1976 China suffered the disaster of Cultural Revolution , there were large institutional swings took place in this period, in which co-operative moved from small to large and from team to brigade to commune again, local free markets, sidelines and private plots was prohibited again, and political factors had a great influence on production decisions.
In late 1970s, after the Leader Chairman Mao passed away, the requirement for improving agricultural productivity came alive. Administrators in provincial-level units with extensive regions of low yields and consequent low standards of living began experimenting with new forms of tenure and production. To avoid frontal conflicts of wide scope with government’s policies and the main ideology, a gradual approach was adopted. The first step of reform was to divide the production team into groups and to fix yield quotas for each group. Each group signed a contract with production team, the contractual items included the conditions of using land, laborers, farm tools and draft animals, the expenditure, labor contribution, rewards for excessive labor contribution and so on. After completing the tasks assigned by the production team, the output could be distributed among work groups according to their labor quotas. And then, the further solution was put forward, namely the typical form of fixing quotas called “all-round contract”, which was initiated by a few brave peasant secretly in Fengyang county of Anhui province. this contract regulated, household was allowed to cultivated a certain parcel farmland in the group, if grain quotas assigned by the state and the collective accumulation were accomplished, the household could own all the residual output. In the light of the contract, peasants were given directly stimulation to produce. The experiment was deemed successful and popular, and it soon spread to all districts.
At another side, political situation was appropriate with the reform form below. In the Eleventh National Party Congress, held August 12- 18, 1977 proclaimed the formal end of the Cultural Revolution, blamed it entirely on the Gang of Four , and reiterated that "the fundamental task of the party in the new historical period is to build China into a modern, powerful socialist country by the end of the twentieth century." The reformer Deng Xiaoping was elected as vice chairman and back to political stage and suggested a series of reform plans, though many contradictions still were apparent, change of policy was regarded as necessary. Rehabilitations of Deng's associates and others sympathetic to these reform plans were stepped up. Not only were some of those purged during the Cultural Revolution returned to power, but also individuals who had fallen from favor as early as the mid-1950s were rehabilitated. It was a time of increased political activism.
In November 1980, the Central Committee of Communist Party of China issued the document Some Issues of Further Reinforcing and Improving the Responsibility System in Agricultural Production. This article manifest the first time that the Party accepted the production responsibility systems developing in practice. In the document fixed output quotas of farmland for each group and responsibility contracts in some specialized obligations were indicated, at the same time, the fixed output quotas for household was also regarded as positive. Under the encouragement of government’s policy and related support measures, plenty of production responsibility systems developed very rapidly in rural areas. In 1981, a wide deeper reform called fixing the contribute quote for each household (bao gan dao hu), which was much more radical, was implemented. In accordance to the system, all collective lands in production teams were to be distributed among households based on their population or laborers. The households could manage the lands, made production decisions by themselves, and bore the results. When tasks assigned by upper government and the collective accumulation, e.g. a certain quantity of grain and livestock, were completed, the remained products could be owned by the households and not distributed among members in the production team. Moreover, if the household made sure that they have enough ration, they had right to sell the left grain to state owned agricultural enterprises or consume them as they want, usually feeding livestock or making wine for example. That meant the model from Fengyang was finally admitted by Party. In October 1983, the Party and the State Counsel issued the document Notice of Separating the Co-operative from Politics and Setting Up the Township Government and required the cooperative to separate from local government. The act ordered that the people's communes were replaced by administrative townships. By the end of 1984, 98% of production teams had taken the reform of Household Responsibility System. It was until then, the collectivization system was dismantled completely.
Some Characters of De-collectivization and Problems left
No restitution
Yet, de-collectivization and the implement of the household responsibility system is neither a reform of the ownership of land nor a process of privatization. As we have mentioned above, after the Communist Party set up its own government in 1949, it started land reform and distributed lands to the poor from landlords and rich peasants. Peasant acquired parcels of land according to the labor forces, then land were registered under name of each household. Before the eve of collectivization, most of lands in rural China were legally privately owned. But when de-collectivization began, peasants did not get back their former lands again. The household responsibility system only distribute the right of manage and benefit of lands among households according to their population or laborers. So, the de-collectivization in China did not like that in most of East European countries such as Bulgaria, Czech, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, but like that in Albania. That is to say, there was no restitution of land. However, in former East European Countries, whether restitution was implemented or not, the de-collectivization had symbiosis with privatization. In China, although during the process of de-collectivization there were in reality some opinions that lands should be restituted, such voices were not accepted, nor even discussed.
The reasons why restitution of land in the de-collectivization of rural China did not happen may lie in some historic reasons. First of all, although peasants in China had private ownership over lands before the collectivization, large percent of peasants owned farmlands that did not belong to them before, they obtain them from political transformation. Theoretically, violence can’t consist the legal reason of transfer of ownership over real estate, therefore even after the terrorize during the land reform at beginning of 1950s, the private ownership of lands, which was made out by the communist government, had not yet became stable and commonly accepted. However, the former landlord class had rooted off during the political movement, land contacts and register books of land title had been destroyed, no one dare to challenge the power of Communist Party anymore. Since the collectivization began soon after the land reform, the new established owner relationship was broken again, when de-collectivization came about, without supports from the central government, most of peasants only took the household responsibility system as another chance of equally distributing lands, just like the land reform in 1949. As to descendants of former landlord class, they might have not forgotten the experience of their poor ancestors’: claiming private right before the Party which regarding public ownership as universal truth is a dangerous deal.
Secondly, different from most country in former communist east European countries , in which farmers’ nominal ownership of lands was remained, even though their lands were requisitioned in collective farms without any payment, and so that it was easy for peasants in these countries to take back the land when the collective farms went over. On the contrary, in China, private ownership of land was totally abolished as soon as the people’s commune system was set up, after 20 years, the collective ownership had already fest basis. As a result, the transaction costs of restitution so high as to wipe it out. That means, even a peasant want to take back the former farmland which belonged to them, it’s very hard to him to collect the relevant evidences to support his claim, moreover, there was no legal justice process to support such application. So normal farmer would rather to accept the Household Responsibility System.
Finally, the key reason lies in the socialism system itself. Even though the Communist Party of had poor performance in leading the country and its people to wealth and happiness during socialist revolution, Chinese people have taken socialism as the characteristic of the country for grant, after all the slogan “ Socialism saved China” has been deeply impressed. So that even after the Culture Revolution, most people still propped up the Party. The Party led the rural reform and decided the de-collectivization. However, the reform is a “liberation of the rural productivity”, which suit the requirement of the Party. Because the Chinese Communist Party insisted that his mission is to realize socialism, and socialism is based on public ownership system. Collective ownership was deemed as one form of public ownership in rural regions, so that as China kept on the road of realizing socialism, “land in rural areas belong to collective” was certainly remained after rural reform, and regulated in the Constitution of 1982, which is valid till now.
At the time of de-collectivization, the dissolution of people’s commune and the wide implement of responsibility system were regard as a great innovation. According to the statistic, The Household Responsibility System did bring about a more prosperous agriculture in China. From 1978 to 1984, grain output in China increased at an annual average rate of 5% and the gross value of agriculture by 7.7% (Lin, 1997). In contrast with former European countries, the de-collectivization seems bring more benefit to Chinese peasants at beginning. So that at that time, rare peasant did realize that such a reform without transformation of ownership was incompletely. However, The natural shortcomings of the de-collectivization would surely bring a series of problems.
institutional problem: land distribution
As we showed above, the de-collectivization ran smoothly and the introduction of Household Responsibility System has got a great success, although it could not address everything as only an institutional innovation. After several years of practice, it has been already proved that there are a number of weaknesses and limitations remained from the incompletely de-collectivization. One has to confirm, that the collective ownership and contract system led to the inequity in both economic and political features.
In economic view, during the de-collectivization, farmland was distributed to individual households in form of fragmented farming units. The principle of land distribution was derived directly from collective ownership. Farmland in a village was owned by all of its members collectively. As a result, every member had equal right to claim on distribution of the land according to certain norm, which was based primarily on the size of the peasant family. In reality of China with abundant population and limited land, the amount can be distributed to each household was very small. Moreover, land differed from each other in terms of soil fertility, irrigation conditions, location and so on. In many cases, a household had to obtain pieces of land from each of the grades. as a result, the sum was not only insufficient but also disjointed and scattered around villages. Large areas of cultivated land were wasted in the form of paths and boundaries separating households' contract field. A survey conducted by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture indicated that in 1986, among 7983 sample villages from 29 provinces, average cultivated area per household was 0.466 ha (7 mu) fragmented into 5.85 plots, each plot on average 0.08 ha (1.2 mu) (Ministry of Agriculture of China, 1993) . This fragmented structure of family farming has remained largely untouched after implement of contract system and has detained the possibilities of using relatively advanced mechanical agricultural equipment and infrastructures.
Under such system, farmers turned to be short-term in action. According to the distribute rule of land in household responsibility system, land is to distribute depended only on villager status, babies and villagers' new-comer such as newly married bride from other villages were all eligible claimants, which having equal rights to share equal amounts of land in this village; on the contrary, when a villager left or died, the right of land claim would automatically withdraw. As population increased, villages had to readjust the distribution structure, which further subdivided the farmland . The endless redistribution of farmland resulted in many problems, including: 1) the situation of a small and fragmented farming structure further deteriorated; 2) worrying about the risk of losing their land as well as investment, farmers had little incentives to improve land conservation and agricultural infrastructure - irrigated land, one of the most significant components of agricultural infrastructure in China, remained almost unchanged during the 1980s; 3) farmers over-exploited the soil to pursue short-term profits; 4) the course of land redistribution was also costly, it required labor and time in organization and execution. (Chen, 1999)
Another problem is that farmland was generally badly endowed with the appropriate human capital. Since egalitarianism was the general leading principle rule, which gave little consideration to interfamily differences such as labor capability, education and individual preference . As a result, some large households with a incomplete labor force could have comparably much more land to cultivate, meanwhile other smaller households, above all those specialized in agriculture, could have only inadequate land for full employment. Such kind of problem was much worse in rural areas experiencing rapid township or village industry and urbanization. In those region there was often deterioration in the agricultural labor force since most of capable labors tended not to work at home as a farmer. There were many who did not give priority to cultivation and at times even let the land lie unused. Consequently, the farmland was underutilized .
Upon preceding analyzing, we can see that, in order to pursue egalitarianism on surface in distribution of land, in the process of the de-collectivization sacrificed economic efficiency. Thus, if the land was private, then those difference arouse from distribution will decease after enough time, because the free market will lead to equal efficiency through the choose of market. However, such political background lacked from beginning on, so that the shortcoming of a non-privatization de-collectivization can’t be corrected or even be enlarged because of problem of political system.
One of the main reason is political structure over the collective ownership. First at grass-root level, it was usually the village head, who takes the power to decide distribution since decentralization. So that the cadre family or their relations will surely benefit from the distribution. Having a cadre in the family seems to be a certain prerogative in using their political status to accumulate wealth. At one hand, Village cadres may allocate more fertile parts of the village land to themselves and determined more favorable grain sales quotas for themselves. And also, cadres have more opportunity to build personal relationship with higher level and other important departments, rural credit banks or transportation companies for example, so that they have more chance to obtain material benefit than normal peasants. As we see, most of collective enterprises and private economies in rural areas have tight relationship with local governments, at the basic level, with villager cadres, most rural enterprisers are villager leader themselves. Furthermore, cadres and their relations generally tend to break the policy of birth control, because they are capable to support more family members, and their kin will strengthen their economic and political power in return.
At another hand, though according to the election regulation of rural cadre in china, these village cadre should be elected directly by villagers, who have common interest in the community, this rule has been almost never put into practice. Under one Party system and public ownership system, all important resources are gathered in the Party’s hand, as a result, instead of election, the opinion from higher level plays a significant role, in order to carry ort the policy of Party efficiently. In fact, two factors determine the candidates in appointment of village head, one is the relationship with official of higher level, and the other is kinship. Consequently, cadre family takes all advantages to maintain their power and status through such appointment. So, cadres in rural China don’t represent the benefit of their village members, but the power of the Party as well as the family, there is no possibility for peasants to claim equality or save their from suffering as a peasant.
In a word, after a short flourish in rural China, which came along with the de-collectivization and the implement of Household Responsibility System, most peasants have to face the irrational occupation and distribution system of farmland and the political system, which is impossible to change. Besides there was strict limitation prevent peasants from abandoning their responsible land and rushing into cities, so that the peasants found it is hard to change their situation or turn it more better and free. This may explain why in rural china exists always the tendency of over population but the income of household began to decrease only after less than 10 years from the de-collectivization. As a result, land reform in China has emerged as a difficult issue in rural areas of exchange between social equality and economic efficiency. It seems obvious that since the mid-1980s the wide rural society has been caught in this predicament: where social equality or equity worsened, and at same time economic efficiency held back.. According to statistics, average net income in countryside has been slowed down for years. In 2000, the household average income only reached 272 dollars, but the Gini coefficient in China base in urban and rural areas rose from 0.21 in 1978 to more than 0. 46.