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关于推进全国美术馆公共图书馆文化馆(站)免费开放工作的意见

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关于推进全国美术馆公共图书馆文化馆(站)免费开放工作的意见

文化部 财政部


关于推进全国美术馆公共图书馆文化馆(站)免费开放工作的意见

文财务发〔2011〕5号


各省、自治区、直辖市文化厅(局)、财政厅(局),新疆生产建设兵团文化广播电视局、财政局:
  为贯彻落实党的十七届五中全会、胡锦涛总书记在中央政治局第22次集体学习时的重要讲话精神和全国文化体制改革工作会议精神,落实温家宝总理在《2010年政府工作报告》中提出的“推进美术馆、图书馆、文化馆、博物馆免费开放,丰富人民群众的精神文化生活”的要求,充分发挥美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)保障公民基本文化权益、提高公民鉴赏能力的重要作用,加强公共文化服务体系建设和公民思想道德建设,现就各级文化行政部门归口管理的美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)进一步向社会免费开放提出以下意见:
  一、美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)免费开放的重要意义
  美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)是政府举办的公益性文化事业单位,是开展公共文化服务的重要场所,是保障人民群众基本文化权益的重要阵地。推动美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)免费开放是党的十七大关于社会主义文化大发展大繁荣的具体实践,是加强社会主义核心价值体系建设和公民思想道德建设的有效手段,是进一步提高政府为全社会提供公共文化服务水平的重要举措,是实现和保障人民群众基本文化权益的积极行动。对于提高广大人民群众思想道德和科学文化素质,保障广大人民群众基本权益,促进社会和谐稳定具有重要意义。
  要统一思想,提高认识,积极行动,切实把免费开放工作做实、做细、做好,为公众提供更多、更好的公共文化产品和服务。
  二、美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)免费开放的指导思想、工作原则和主要目标
  (一)指导思想
  以邓小平理论和“三个代表”重要思想为指导,深入贯彻落实科学发展观和党的十七届五中全会精神,进一步推进公益性文化事业单位改革,着眼于保障公民基本文化权益,促进基本公共文化服务均等化,着眼于发挥公共文化机构的基本职能作用,着眼于增强公共文化服务能力和管理水平,以健全和增强服务项目、服务能力为重点,与建立公共文化服务体系经费保障机制相结合,努力实现美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)设施免费开放,与其职能相应的基本文化服务项目健全,免费向群众提供,公共文化服务能力明显增强。
  (二)工作原则
  1. 全面推开,逐步完善。贯彻落实中央关于公共文化机构免费开放的要求,全面推动美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)免费开放。在推进免费开放的过程中,建立与其职能任务相适应的基本文化服务内容和方式,加强管理,深化改革,提升服务能力。
  2. 坚持公益,保障基本。免费开放作为政府的重要文化民生项目,免费提供的是与美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)职能相适应的基本公共文化服务,应由政府予以保障落实。同时,对于基本公共文化服务以外的文化服务项目,要坚持公益性,降低收费标准,不得以营利为目的。
  3. 科学设计,注重实效。紧紧结合美术馆、图书馆、文化馆(站)基本职能,研究确定基本服务项目和内容;以免费开放为契机,加强规范化建设,实现美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)规章制度健全,职责任务清晰,服务内容明确,公共文化设施的利用率明显提高,免费开放落到实处,切实保障人民群众基本文化权益。
  4. 扩大宣传,树立形象。免费开放的根本目的是让广大人民群众就近方便地参与文化活动,保护群众的基本文化权益。要加强免费开放的宣传工作,通过形式多样的宣传,让更多的群众了解美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)的功能和作用,吸引广大群众走进文化设施,享受政府提供的公共文化服务,同时树立美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)的良好社会形象。
  (三)总体目标
  到2012年底,与深化文化体制改革、提升公共文化服务能力相结合,实现美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)规章制度健全,职责任务清晰,服务内容明确,保障机制完善,健全与其职能相适应的基本文化服务项目并免费向群众提供,设施利用率明显提高,使免费服务成为政府的重要民生项目和公共文化服务品牌。
  三、美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)免费开放的基本内容和实施步骤
  (一)美术馆免费开放的基本内容
  美术馆基本展览实行免费参观。对于少数特殊展览,可根据实际情况实行低票价。
  (二)公共图书馆、文化馆(站)免费开放的基本内容
  公共图书馆、文化馆(站)免费开放包括两个方面:一是指公共空间设施场地的免费开放,二是指与其职能相适应的基本公共文化服务项目健全并免费向群众提供。基本公共文化服务项目将随着社会的不断发展、政府财力的增长和人民群众精神文化需求的不断增长而发展变化。
  1. 公共图书馆免费开放主要包括:一般阅览室、少年儿童阅览室、多媒体阅览室(电子阅览室)、报告厅(培训室、综合活动室)、自修室等公共空间设施场地免费开放;文献资源借阅、检索与咨询、公益性讲座和展览、基层辅导、流动服务等基本文化服务项目健全并免费提供;为保障基本职能实现的一些辅助性服务如办证、验证及存包等全部免费。
  2. 文化馆免费开放主要包括:多功能厅、展览厅(陈列厅)、宣传廊、辅导培训教室、计算机与网络教室、舞蹈(综合)排练室、独立学习室(音乐、书法、美术、曲艺等)、娱乐活动室等公共空间设施场地的免费开放;普及性的文化艺术辅导培训、时政法制科普教育、公益性群众文化活动、公益性展览展示、培训基层队伍和业余文艺骨干、指导群众文艺作品创作等基本文化服务项目健全并免费提供;为保障基本职能实现的一些辅助性服务如办证、存包等全部免费。
  3. 文化站免费开放主要包括:多功能厅、展览厅(陈列厅)、辅导培训教室、计算机与网络教室等公共空间设施场地的免费开放;书报刊借阅、时政法制科普教育、群众文艺演出活动、数字文化信息服务、公共文化资源配送和流动服务、体育健身、青少年校外活动等服务项目健全并免费提供;为保障基本职能实现的一些辅助性服务如办证、存包等全部免费。
  (三)美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)免费开放的实施步骤
  1. 美术馆免费开放的具体实施步骤分为两个阶段:
  第一阶段:在2011年年底之前国家级、省级美术馆全部向公众免费开放。
  第二阶段:在2012年年底之前各级美术馆全部向公众免费开放。
  2.公共图书馆、文化馆(站)免费开放的具体实施步骤分两个阶段:
  第一阶段:到2011年底,全国所有公共图书馆、文化馆(站)实现无障碍、零门槛进入,公共空间设施场地全部免费开放,所提供的基本服务项目全部免费。
  第二阶段:到2012年底,全国所有一级馆、省级馆、省会城市馆、东部地区馆站免费提供的基本公共文化服务质量和水平不断提升,形成2个以上服务品牌。其它图书馆、文化馆站实现基本公共文化服务项目健全,并免费提供。
  四、推进美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)免费开放的具体举措
  (一)取消原有部分收费项目
  取消美术馆门票收费,取消公共图书馆办证费、验证费、自修室使用费、电子阅览室上网费,取消公共图书馆、文化馆(站)存包费,限期取消文化馆(站)群众文化艺术辅导和培训费,业余文艺骨干培训费,公益性讲座、展览收费。
  (二)限期收回出租设施      
  要严格执行《公共文化体育设施条例》和中央《关于加强公共文化服务体系建设的若干意见》、《关于进一步加强农村文化建设的意见》,维护好美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)的公益性质,不得以拍卖、租赁等任何形式改变公共文化设施用途,已挪作它用的限期收回。
  (三)降低非基本服务收费
  公共图书馆、文化馆(站)除基本公共服务外,为满足广大基层群众多层次、多样化的需求,开展了多种多样的公益性服务。如公共图书馆深度参考咨询服务(为读者收集专题信息,编写参考资料,或者进行代查、代译、复印书刊资料等服务)、赔偿性收费和文化馆(站)的高端艺术培训服务等,可以收取合理的费用。在财政经费保障机制建立的前提下,各级公共图书馆、文化馆(站)应把主要精力用于开展基本公共文化服务。基本公共文化服务以外的公益性服务,要与市场价格有所区分,降低收费标准,按照成本价格为群众提供服务。
  (四)完善免费开放公示制度
  美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)要公示免费开放内容,在窗口接待、场所引导、资料提供以及内容讲解等方面创造良好的服务环境,增强吸引力。
  (五)制定应急预案
  美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)要切实做好免费开放的前期准备,充分考虑免费开放后可能遇到的各种情况和问题,制定切实可行、严谨细致的免费开放工作方案。要制定突发事件的应急预案,完善应急处置机制,确保免费开放后的公众安全、资源安全、设施设备安全。
  (六)加强免费开放的宣传
  要开展形式多样的宣传活动,扩大免费开放的公众知晓率,吸引广大群众走进文化设施,最大限度地发挥美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)功能作用。
  五、美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆免费开放的保障机制
  免费开放是实施民生工程的重要内容,是保障广大人民群众基本文化权益、提高公民鉴赏能力的重要举措。各级文化、财政部门要高度重视,加强领导,采取措施,加强管理和创新,保证这一惠民措施真正落到实处。
  (一)加强组织保障
  各级文化、财政部门要加强对免费开放工作的组织领导,将免费开放作为公共文化服务体系建设的重点工作,纳入文化建设总体规划,纳入重要议事日程,纳入财政预算。要建立统筹协调、密切配合、分工协作的工作机制,加强免费开放工作的组织和领导。要充分依靠专家,加强对免费开放工作方案的制度设计和科学研究,保证免费开放工作科学有序地开展。
  (二)建立经费保障机制
  各级财政部门要进一步明确美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)公益性文化单位性质,按照“增加投入、转换机制、增强活力、改善服务”的原则,建立免费开放经费保障机制,保证免费开放后正常运转并提供基本公共文化服务。中央财政安排专项资金,重点对中西部地区美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)开展基本公共文化服务项目所需经费予以补助,对东部地区予以适当奖励。要逐步提高经费保障水平,不断健全美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)免费提供的基本公共文化服务项目,提升服务质量。探索建立公共文化多元化投入机制,鼓励社会力量对美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)进行捐赠和投入,拓宽经费来源渠道。
  (三)深化改革,增强发展活力。要按照中央关于深化文化体制改革的总体部署,推动公共文化服务体制机制创新,优化组织结构,改进内部管理,创新服务方式,提高运营效率。进一步深化公益性文化单位内部机制改革,在人事、分配制度等方面大胆创新,形成讲实绩、重贡献、向优秀人才和关键岗位倾斜的分配机制。建立健全各项规章制度,以制度管人、以制度管事,增强发展活力。
  (四)加强管理,拓展服务领域。要根据群众的需求,结合公共文化事业特点和本地本单位实际,整合业务流程,合理调配资源,改善服务效能。不断拓展服务领域、方式和手段,提供更加人性化的服务设施和服务项目,努力强化文化的感染力和辐射力,最大限度地缓解因免费开放带来的供需矛盾。要尊重和贴近服务对象的文化需求,在实现均等普惠的公共服务基础上,逐步增设多样化服务,重点增加对未成年人、老年人、农民工等特殊人群的对象化服务。
  (五)加强监管,建立评估体系。在各级党委、政府的领导下,各级文化、财政部门要指导、督促各地做好免费开放工作,并对各单位实施情况进行督促检查和考评,对开放中出现的问题和困难及时沟通、协调,切实帮助解决免费开放中遇到的困难和问题。各级文化行政部门要发挥行业管理作用,加快完善美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)业务规范化建设,开展评估定级,加强分类指导,不断提高管理水平和服务能力。要加强宣传,扩大免费开放的社会影响,让更多群众了解美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆站的功能作用,吸引广大群众走进文化设施,共享改革开放带来的文化发展成果。
  各地要按照本通知要求,结合本地实际,尽快制订本地区推进美术馆、公共图书馆、文化馆(站)免费开放工作的实施方案,于2011年3月1日前报送文化部、财政部。
                           文化部 财政部
                         二○一一年一月二十六日


Student:Dayong Zhou

dayong_77@hotmail.com


The Collectivizationa and De-collectivization in Rural China

周大勇 (Zhou,Dayong)

Abstract: the process of de-collectivization took place 25 years ago, however it was uncompleted, which determined that china has to make great effort to continue his rural reform, in order to liberate the peasant and the status of rural region as the Party promised. In China, the non-privatization reform occurred along with the de-collectivization was a uncompleted reform, which remains the defects of both collectivization and small-scale peasant economy, therefore it restricts the development of the rural society, however, the current system seems unable also reluctantly to change it. This paper intents to introduce the process of the collectivization and the most important rural reform in this century, namely the de-collectivization, the demonstrates the progression of de-collectivization, its characters as well as the problems left to be solve.
Keywords: collectivization De-collectivization collective ownership incomplete

Foreword
I am pleased that I am allowed to write the term paper about China. China was influenced by Marxism and walked in detour of history for half century. Before Marxism bankrupted in former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe countries, China had adopted a different way to reform from those countries. Because of the difference in aspects of historical evolution, political forms and natural environment, it’s hard to compare the rural society of China with these former socialism countries directly, also, the progression of collectivization and its end are different in two continents.
Rural china before collectivization
Collectivization was a mark system of the socialist state. Although in the era of Utopian socialism, Robert Owen for example has already attempted to set up the collective farm, but it wasn’t pursued by force strength of government. Even the founder of communism Marx didn’t agree that communism could be realized in undeveloped countries with extremely poor productivity . It was Russia, the serf country, in which Communist took power without adequate preparation; collectivization was implemented by force, in order to consolidate the rule in grass-root countryside. This experience has influenced China and Eastern Europe, because one of the merits of the collectivization lies in being easy to be managed, the other lies in being easy to deprive peasants.
China was a backward country, which suffered from ignorance and war for centuries. Throughout the centuries some 80 to 90 percent of the Chinese population were farmers and live in one of some 900,000 villages, which have an average population of from 1,000 to 2,000 people. Villages were not self-contained, self-sufficient units. Clusters of villages centered on small market towns, which linked them to the wider economy and society by providing not only opportunities to buy and sell but also opportunities for entertainment, information, social life, and a host of specialized services. The traditional Chinese elite, often referred to in English as the gentry dispersed across the country and often lived in rural areas, where they were the dominant figures on the local scene, normally ruled villages. Although they held land, which they rented to tenant farmers, they neither possessed large estates like European nobles nor held hereditary titles. However, they traditionally interpreted central policies and national values for villagers. As in feudal relationship, the peasants and gentry live depend on each other. Gentry provided land to poor peasants and tenant, and work with rich and middle peasants to secure the order in village, for instance opening school and building basic infrastructures to maintain there social status. In Chinese history, at the beginning of very dynasty, the land relationship between landlord and poor peasants were comparably fair, that meant, peasant have parcel farmland to live on. But land tended to be concentrated on end every dynasty, then there might be a peasant uprising led to a new dynasty and retribution of land. This is the basic clue of social evolution in China before communist period.
After the Chinese Communist Party came into power in mainland, it had to keep its promise, which it made during the period of war to encourage the peasant to join the army, that it would gave peasant their own land. The first major action took place from 1940s to early 1950s. June 1950, a new Land Reform Law of new People’s Republic was promulgated and stipulated nullification of the feudal land ownership system, and institutionalization of the system of land ownership by peasants, in which the Party sent agents to every village to carry out the land reform policy. This in itself was an unprecedented show of political power and the resolution of transform an old society. The reform was successful, because the peasants supported the policy; most of them had been waiting for the reform for long time. In the light of the reform law, land were redistribute from the landlords, land-owning trusts or wealthier families to the poor segments in the same village; village elites, who might be expected to go up against the Party and its programs were brought down; new leadership was established by poor peasants who showed the most loyalty to the party's goals; instead of kinship group or patron-client ties, class status became new relationship among villagers.
the process of Collectivization
However, the Party’s leaders were not satisfied with the privatization of land, at one hand, such ownership, according to the doctrine of socialism, should have been abolished in the state of socialism, at another hand, private ownership of small peasantry had no function of property accumulation for the country. At that time, in order to accelerate the construction of socialism, China had launched The First Five-Year Plan after the Soviet model; heavy industry development was profound stressed since the leaders of Communist Party regard socialist country as a country with developed industry sectors. However, the situation in early 1950s was not ideal for a new country. Pressing of needs for food in a country with burgeoning population, domestic capital for investment, and purchase of Soviet-supplied technology, capital equipment, and military hardware. To satisfy these needs, collectivize agriculture was put forward. Collectivization was regard as a method to turn countryside to stabile backing, which can be managed as semi-military and had rare contact with outside, so that the government could press the price of agricultural products by means of scissors difference between cities and countryside, and seize huge numbers of profit from agriculture economies to support the industrialization in city. At the same time, the government had already nationalized banking, industry, and even trade. Private enterprise was already virtually abolished in national wide.
Despite internal disagreement as to the speed of collectivization, preliminary collectivization was launched since 1952. China's peasantry saw Chairman Mao and the Communist Party as heroic much more than Russia's peasantry had seen Stalin and the Bolsheviks as heroes, and through 1956 the peasantry cooperated with the Party. There was none of the resistance and warfare that had accompanied the collectivization of agriculture in the Soviet Union.
The collectivization of agriculture was basically completed with the establishment of the people's communes in 1958. The People’s Commune system was defined as a unity of politics and production, in which all members of the commune jointly owned property. Essentially, the commune system was based on private contract of its members and the principle of voluntaries and mutual benefit, however, it turned out yet as coercive institutional arrangement, which was made by government with political power. In the movement to achieve the People’ s Commune, peasants had no choice whether or not to join.
Communes were designed as large, embracing scores of villages created by combining some 20 or 30 advanced producers' cooperatives of 20,000 to 30,000 members on average, in some cases the membership varied from as few as 6,000 to over 40,000. It was instituted as an organization with functions of the lowest level of local government and the highest level of organization in agricultural production. Communes consisted of three organizational levels: the central commune administration; the production brigade , and the production team, which generally consisted of around thirty families. This kind of institution was an organization of hierarchies, in which the commune acted as political unit and top manager, the brigades played role of co-coordinators between the commune and the basic production teams. The production team was basic units of production and accounting. Since the people’s commune system was a tool established to extract resources from agriculture sector for industrialization, as a result, it neglected peasants’ incentive completely. In order to let the people’s commune system run, the central government designed an relative effective mechanism to encourage managers in each hierarchy to work enthusiastically, yet, in each level, the managers were treated differently and there was a clear difference in aspects of identity and welfare between the managers of the commune and of the brigades or production teams.
The commune was defined as administrative organ and executed the central government’s orders, and paid from central government’s budget, therefore the managers in the level of commune were “state cadres” , that means they were formal governmental officials and got wage monthly. These state cadres could be promoted and became officials of governmental divisions in higher level. Brigades and production teams were collective economic organizations, their running expenses came from production teams’ tribute. Managers in brigades level were called “collective cadres” . They were remunerated in their own production teams according to their labor quotas. Their wage was paid in the form of products instead of money. Managers in production teams were“team cadres”, they were also members of the production team. They worked as peasant like their workmates, and were paid in products according to labor quotas. Team cadres could be promoted to collective cadres. Collective and team cadres had little possibilities to be promoted and became members of state cadres. Nevertheless, as collective and team cadres had some privileges. For example, collective managers had the power of assigning state’s delivery quotas and production tasks among production teams, they determined who could enrolled in state-owned factories, universities and army. The production team managers executed the power of assigning work and distributing products among collective members. Furthermore, in the period of many political movements and class struggles, the identity of cadre could protect their families, relatives and themselves from being denounced and bullied (Tan, 1999).
At beginning, the commune itself was decorated as the representation of socialist society and had all merits of public ownership. Although nearly all the private property had been deprived, peasants had to praise the new system profusely. it was true, most poor peasants found that their lives changed, by eating in the public dining they didn’t need to worry about their own budget anymore, and by working together, they were not necessary to try their best. Following propaganda appeared in newspapers everyday:
The public dining halls are distributed in a way that members need walk only a few minutes from their homes to take their meals. On the freshly whitewashed walls of the one on Shihfuchien Street, a typical establishment, there is a big slogan in red, which reads, "High Spirits for Higher Production!" Its kitchen, to which the visitor is drawn by the aroma of food and the clatter of pots, is managed by Tu Hsiu-chen, the first volunteer cook, who has since learned large-scale catering from the chef at one of the city's restaurants.
The walls of the spacious dining room are decorated with paintings, as a home might be. Its tables and chairs, though simple, are scrubbed to a shining cleanliness. The food is fresh and tasty -- vegetables are grown by the commune itself. The staff make a special point of studying the diet and preferences of old people, children, nursing mothers and members with ailments. There is a separate room for parents with small children, provided with low tables for the little ones.( People’s Daily, 1958)
However, in practice, this ideal, extremely centralized form commune didn’t keep running well in most areas. Very soon it became clear that in most cases the communes were too clumsy to carry out successfully all the managerial and administrative functions that were assigned to them. The cooperative led to low-efficiency, the advantages of large-scale productivity didn’t arrive as peasants anticipated, productivity began to drop and discontent emerged. The reason lies in insufficient utilization of resources and lack of incentive of peasants. At one hand, the output of cooperation comes from all members’ work, in which the tribute of single household is difficult to be measured. So that opportunism like shirking happened naturally very frequently. An effective way to prevent shirking is to have all members supervised, but the seasonal work and spatial diversity of agricultural productive activities make it difficult to totally supervise. At the other hand, although brigade and production team cadres were obliged to complete state’s planning and all kinds of deliveries, the control right and residual claim of the people’s commune system were in the state’s hand, these cadres at grass-level could not design any reasonable incentive mechanism to encourage peasants to work hard and produce according to reasonable natural condition, such as soil, irrigation and farm year. The way left for brigade and team cadres was to punish peasants by struggling against them or maltreatment. But the brigade and team cadres also belonged to members of production teams, they and their families lived in the same community with their subordinates as well, so punishing peasants could also make themselves in trouble. Moreover, under the property rights structure of the commune system, the rest of output was not belong to the commune, brigade or even production team, but to the governments of higher level. This made the supervisors’ effort unrelated to any reward. As a result, even the supervisor himself has not enough incentive to work and shirk himself sometimes. In a word, under such conditions of poor supervision, in which all the work was distributed equally among all members at the lowest level--production team, shirking became every member’s rational choice and further weakening the efficiency of the system (Lin,1990).
De-collectivization
To prevent peasants from slow down, shrinking and escaping in work, and assure the system could keep on moving, the party collected all productive equipments and forbid members in people’s commune engaging in private production and business on the one hand, and at same time deprived peasants’ right of migrating from countryside to city or between districts by means of household registration on the other hand. Nevertheless, such policies had no effect on improving incentive of peasants, but they formed at least political press on very member of people’s commune, because it turned out that everyone’s only routine is to stay in the commune and finish one’s task. Without the right to leave or get better than others, peasants commonly chose to work with little effort, e.g. a passive method, to evade production tasks assigned by leader. Little accumulation and shirking made countryside widely fall into poverty , rare rural region had good conditions to develop industry or to improve commerce, infrastructures went worse, productivity sank quickly. The most serious crisis for agricultural collectivization happened between 1959 and 1961. GNP decreased from 213.8 billion Yuan in 1958 to 180.0 billion Yuan in 1962, with an average annual reduction of 15.1% in gross industrial production value and an average annual reduction of 19.3% in gross agricultural production value from 1958 to 1960. Owing to the serious shortage of food, a great famine took place in the whole country and at least 30 million residents died (Tan, 2000). Discontent with such system broke out, in some areas, peasants didn’t want to relied so heavily on orders from above and made so little allowance for local conditions or local initiative. The severe crisis forced the Party to adjust their policies. From 1961 on, commune functions were reduced to administration and co-ordination, production team was confirmed as the basic unit of accounting, certain production decision making was delegated to production teams, which were allowed to retain some income to overcome problems of egalitarianism; households again allowed to have small private plots and sidelines for planting vegetables, and a limited opening markets for transaction between urban and rural areas. However, these adjustments didn’t mean to change the system of people’s commune, but only to prevent peasants from rebel. From 1966 to 1976 China suffered the disaster of Cultural Revolution , there were large institutional swings took place in this period, in which co-operative moved from small to large and from team to brigade to commune again, local free markets, sidelines and private plots was prohibited again, and political factors had a great influence on production decisions.
In late 1970s, after the Leader Chairman Mao passed away, the requirement for improving agricultural productivity came alive. Administrators in provincial-level units with extensive regions of low yields and consequent low standards of living began experimenting with new forms of tenure and production. To avoid frontal conflicts of wide scope with government’s policies and the main ideology, a gradual approach was adopted. The first step of reform was to divide the production team into groups and to fix yield quotas for each group. Each group signed a contract with production team, the contractual items included the conditions of using land, laborers, farm tools and draft animals, the expenditure, labor contribution, rewards for excessive labor contribution and so on. After completing the tasks assigned by the production team, the output could be distributed among work groups according to their labor quotas. And then, the further solution was put forward, namely the typical form of fixing quotas called “all-round contract”, which was initiated by a few brave peasant secretly in Fengyang county of Anhui province. this contract regulated, household was allowed to cultivated a certain parcel farmland in the group, if grain quotas assigned by the state and the collective accumulation were accomplished, the household could own all the residual output. In the light of the contract, peasants were given directly stimulation to produce. The experiment was deemed successful and popular, and it soon spread to all districts.
At another side, political situation was appropriate with the reform form below. In the Eleventh National Party Congress, held August 12- 18, 1977 proclaimed the formal end of the Cultural Revolution, blamed it entirely on the Gang of Four , and reiterated that "the fundamental task of the party in the new historical period is to build China into a modern, powerful socialist country by the end of the twentieth century." The reformer Deng Xiaoping was elected as vice chairman and back to political stage and suggested a series of reform plans, though many contradictions still were apparent, change of policy was regarded as necessary. Rehabilitations of Deng's associates and others sympathetic to these reform plans were stepped up. Not only were some of those purged during the Cultural Revolution returned to power, but also individuals who had fallen from favor as early as the mid-1950s were rehabilitated. It was a time of increased political activism.
In November 1980, the Central Committee of Communist Party of China issued the document Some Issues of Further Reinforcing and Improving the Responsibility System in Agricultural Production. This article manifest the first time that the Party accepted the production responsibility systems developing in practice. In the document fixed output quotas of farmland for each group and responsibility contracts in some specialized obligations were indicated, at the same time, the fixed output quotas for household was also regarded as positive. Under the encouragement of government’s policy and related support measures, plenty of production responsibility systems developed very rapidly in rural areas. In 1981, a wide deeper reform called fixing the contribute quote for each household (bao gan dao hu), which was much more radical, was implemented. In accordance to the system, all collective lands in production teams were to be distributed among households based on their population or laborers. The households could manage the lands, made production decisions by themselves, and bore the results. When tasks assigned by upper government and the collective accumulation, e.g. a certain quantity of grain and livestock, were completed, the remained products could be owned by the households and not distributed among members in the production team. Moreover, if the household made sure that they have enough ration, they had right to sell the left grain to state owned agricultural enterprises or consume them as they want, usually feeding livestock or making wine for example. That meant the model from Fengyang was finally admitted by Party. In October 1983, the Party and the State Counsel issued the document Notice of Separating the Co-operative from Politics and Setting Up the Township Government and required the cooperative to separate from local government. The act ordered that the people's communes were replaced by administrative townships. By the end of 1984, 98% of production teams had taken the reform of Household Responsibility System. It was until then, the collectivization system was dismantled completely.
Some Characters of De-collectivization and Problems left
No restitution
Yet, de-collectivization and the implement of the household responsibility system is neither a reform of the ownership of land nor a process of privatization. As we have mentioned above, after the Communist Party set up its own government in 1949, it started land reform and distributed lands to the poor from landlords and rich peasants. Peasant acquired parcels of land according to the labor forces, then land were registered under name of each household. Before the eve of collectivization, most of lands in rural China were legally privately owned. But when de-collectivization began, peasants did not get back their former lands again. The household responsibility system only distribute the right of manage and benefit of lands among households according to their population or laborers. So, the de-collectivization in China did not like that in most of East European countries such as Bulgaria, Czech, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia, but like that in Albania. That is to say, there was no restitution of land. However, in former East European Countries, whether restitution was implemented or not, the de-collectivization had symbiosis with privatization. In China, although during the process of de-collectivization there were in reality some opinions that lands should be restituted, such voices were not accepted, nor even discussed.
The reasons why restitution of land in the de-collectivization of rural China did not happen may lie in some historic reasons. First of all, although peasants in China had private ownership over lands before the collectivization, large percent of peasants owned farmlands that did not belong to them before, they obtain them from political transformation. Theoretically, violence can’t consist the legal reason of transfer of ownership over real estate, therefore even after the terrorize during the land reform at beginning of 1950s, the private ownership of lands, which was made out by the communist government, had not yet became stable and commonly accepted. However, the former landlord class had rooted off during the political movement, land contacts and register books of land title had been destroyed, no one dare to challenge the power of Communist Party anymore. Since the collectivization began soon after the land reform, the new established owner relationship was broken again, when de-collectivization came about, without supports from the central government, most of peasants only took the household responsibility system as another chance of equally distributing lands, just like the land reform in 1949. As to descendants of former landlord class, they might have not forgotten the experience of their poor ancestors’: claiming private right before the Party which regarding public ownership as universal truth is a dangerous deal.
Secondly, different from most country in former communist east European countries , in which farmers’ nominal ownership of lands was remained, even though their lands were requisitioned in collective farms without any payment, and so that it was easy for peasants in these countries to take back the land when the collective farms went over. On the contrary, in China, private ownership of land was totally abolished as soon as the people’s commune system was set up, after 20 years, the collective ownership had already fest basis. As a result, the transaction costs of restitution so high as to wipe it out. That means, even a peasant want to take back the former farmland which belonged to them, it’s very hard to him to collect the relevant evidences to support his claim, moreover, there was no legal justice process to support such application. So normal farmer would rather to accept the Household Responsibility System.
Finally, the key reason lies in the socialism system itself. Even though the Communist Party of had poor performance in leading the country and its people to wealth and happiness during socialist revolution, Chinese people have taken socialism as the characteristic of the country for grant, after all the slogan “ Socialism saved China” has been deeply impressed. So that even after the Culture Revolution, most people still propped up the Party. The Party led the rural reform and decided the de-collectivization. However, the reform is a “liberation of the rural productivity”, which suit the requirement of the Party. Because the Chinese Communist Party insisted that his mission is to realize socialism, and socialism is based on public ownership system. Collective ownership was deemed as one form of public ownership in rural regions, so that as China kept on the road of realizing socialism, “land in rural areas belong to collective” was certainly remained after rural reform, and regulated in the Constitution of 1982, which is valid till now.
At the time of de-collectivization, the dissolution of people’s commune and the wide implement of responsibility system were regard as a great innovation. According to the statistic, The Household Responsibility System did bring about a more prosperous agriculture in China. From 1978 to 1984, grain output in China increased at an annual average rate of 5% and the gross value of agriculture by 7.7% (Lin, 1997). In contrast with former European countries, the de-collectivization seems bring more benefit to Chinese peasants at beginning. So that at that time, rare peasant did realize that such a reform without transformation of ownership was incompletely. However, The natural shortcomings of the de-collectivization would surely bring a series of problems.
institutional problem: land distribution
As we showed above, the de-collectivization ran smoothly and the introduction of Household Responsibility System has got a great success, although it could not address everything as only an institutional innovation. After several years of practice, it has been already proved that there are a number of weaknesses and limitations remained from the incompletely de-collectivization. One has to confirm, that the collective ownership and contract system led to the inequity in both economic and political features.
In economic view, during the de-collectivization, farmland was distributed to individual households in form of fragmented farming units. The principle of land distribution was derived directly from collective ownership. Farmland in a village was owned by all of its members collectively. As a result, every member had equal right to claim on distribution of the land according to certain norm, which was based primarily on the size of the peasant family. In reality of China with abundant population and limited land, the amount can be distributed to each household was very small. Moreover, land differed from each other in terms of soil fertility, irrigation conditions, location and so on. In many cases, a household had to obtain pieces of land from each of the grades. as a result, the sum was not only insufficient but also disjointed and scattered around villages. Large areas of cultivated land were wasted in the form of paths and boundaries separating households' contract field. A survey conducted by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture indicated that in 1986, among 7983 sample villages from 29 provinces, average cultivated area per household was 0.466 ha (7 mu) fragmented into 5.85 plots, each plot on average 0.08 ha (1.2 mu) (Ministry of Agriculture of China, 1993) . This fragmented structure of family farming has remained largely untouched after implement of contract system and has detained the possibilities of using relatively advanced mechanical agricultural equipment and infrastructures.
Under such system, farmers turned to be short-term in action. According to the distribute rule of land in household responsibility system, land is to distribute depended only on villager status, babies and villagers' new-comer such as newly married bride from other villages were all eligible claimants, which having equal rights to share equal amounts of land in this village; on the contrary, when a villager left or died, the right of land claim would automatically withdraw. As population increased, villages had to readjust the distribution structure, which further subdivided the farmland . The endless redistribution of farmland resulted in many problems, including: 1) the situation of a small and fragmented farming structure further deteriorated; 2) worrying about the risk of losing their land as well as investment, farmers had little incentives to improve land conservation and agricultural infrastructure - irrigated land, one of the most significant components of agricultural infrastructure in China, remained almost unchanged during the 1980s; 3) farmers over-exploited the soil to pursue short-term profits; 4) the course of land redistribution was also costly, it required labor and time in organization and execution. (Chen, 1999)
Another problem is that farmland was generally badly endowed with the appropriate human capital. Since egalitarianism was the general leading principle rule, which gave little consideration to interfamily differences such as labor capability, education and individual preference . As a result, some large households with a incomplete labor force could have comparably much more land to cultivate, meanwhile other smaller households, above all those specialized in agriculture, could have only inadequate land for full employment. Such kind of problem was much worse in rural areas experiencing rapid township or village industry and urbanization. In those region there was often deterioration in the agricultural labor force since most of capable labors tended not to work at home as a farmer. There were many who did not give priority to cultivation and at times even let the land lie unused. Consequently, the farmland was underutilized .
Upon preceding analyzing, we can see that, in order to pursue egalitarianism on surface in distribution of land, in the process of the de-collectivization sacrificed economic efficiency. Thus, if the land was private, then those difference arouse from distribution will decease after enough time, because the free market will lead to equal efficiency through the choose of market. However, such political background lacked from beginning on, so that the shortcoming of a non-privatization de-collectivization can’t be corrected or even be enlarged because of problem of political system.
One of the main reason is political structure over the collective ownership. First at grass-root level, it was usually the village head, who takes the power to decide distribution since decentralization. So that the cadre family or their relations will surely benefit from the distribution. Having a cadre in the family seems to be a certain prerogative in using their political status to accumulate wealth. At one hand, Village cadres may allocate more fertile parts of the village land to themselves and determined more favorable grain sales quotas for themselves. And also, cadres have more opportunity to build personal relationship with higher level and other important departments, rural credit banks or transportation companies for example, so that they have more chance to obtain material benefit than normal peasants. As we see, most of collective enterprises and private economies in rural areas have tight relationship with local governments, at the basic level, with villager cadres, most rural enterprisers are villager leader themselves. Furthermore, cadres and their relations generally tend to break the policy of birth control, because they are capable to support more family members, and their kin will strengthen their economic and political power in return.
At another hand, though according to the election regulation of rural cadre in china, these village cadre should be elected directly by villagers, who have common interest in the community, this rule has been almost never put into practice. Under one Party system and public ownership system, all important resources are gathered in the Party’s hand, as a result, instead of election, the opinion from higher level plays a significant role, in order to carry ort the policy of Party efficiently. In fact, two factors determine the candidates in appointment of village head, one is the relationship with official of higher level, and the other is kinship. Consequently, cadre family takes all advantages to maintain their power and status through such appointment. So, cadres in rural China don’t represent the benefit of their village members, but the power of the Party as well as the family, there is no possibility for peasants to claim equality or save their from suffering as a peasant.
In a word, after a short flourish in rural China, which came along with the de-collectivization and the implement of Household Responsibility System, most peasants have to face the irrational occupation and distribution system of farmland and the political system, which is impossible to change. Besides there was strict limitation prevent peasants from abandoning their responsible land and rushing into cities, so that the peasants found it is hard to change their situation or turn it more better and free. This may explain why in rural china exists always the tendency of over population but the income of household began to decrease only after less than 10 years from the de-collectivization. As a result, land reform in China has emerged as a difficult issue in rural areas of exchange between social equality and economic efficiency. It seems obvious that since the mid-1980s the wide rural society has been caught in this predicament: where social equality or equity worsened, and at same time economic efficiency held back.. According to statistics, average net income in countryside has been slowed down for years. In 2000, the household average income only reached 272 dollars, but the Gini coefficient in China base in urban and rural areas rose from 0.21 in 1978 to more than 0. 46.

关于印发龙岩市环境保护监督管理“一岗双责”实施意见的通知

福建省龙岩市人民政府


关于印发龙岩市环境保护监督管理“一岗双责”实施意见的通知

龙政综〔2010〕82号


各县(市、区)人民政府,市直各有关部门:

  《龙岩市环境保护监督管理“一岗双责”实施意见》已经市政府第四十九次常务会审议通过,现印发给你们,请认真贯彻执行。特此通知。

  

  

  龙岩市人民政府

                 二○一○年三月三日

  

  

龙岩市环境保护监督管理“一岗双责”实施意见

  

  根据《中华人民共和国环境保护法》和《福建省环境保护监督管理“一岗双责”暂行规定》(闽政[2010]1号)等环保法律、法规和有关规定,结合我市实际,特制定本实施意见。

  一、总体要求

  第一条 全面贯彻落实科学发展观,落实环境保护行政责任,持续推进生态型经济枢纽和海峡西岸经济区重要增长极建设,努力把龙岩建设成为国家环境保护模范城市。

  第二条 本市各级地方人民政府及有关部门履行环境保护监督管理职责,适用本实施意见。法律、法规和规章另有规定的,从其规定。

  第三条 各企事业单位是其环境保护工作的责任主体,应对其环境污染或生态破坏行为负责;政府及有关部门是环境保护的监督管理主体;各级人民政府环境保护部门是对环境保护实施统一监督管理的机关;各级政府有关部门在各自职责范围内,对环境保护实施监督管理。

  第四条 环境保护监督管理,坚持预防为主、防治结合、综合治理、经济社会全面协调可持续发展的方针;实行“属地管理与分级管理相结合,以属地管理为主”和“谁主管、谁负责”、“谁审批、谁负责”、“谁污染、谁治理”、“谁破坏、谁恢复”的原则。

  第五条 环境保护工作必须坚持并落实“一岗双责”。政府及有关部门的主要负责人是本行政区域、本部门职责范围内环境保护工作的第一责任人,对环境保护工作负全面领导责任;分管环境保护工作的负责人对环境保护工作负综合监管领导责任;其他负责人对分管业务工作范围内的环境保护工作负直接领导责任。

  二、政府及有关部门环境保护工作职责

  第六条 各级人民政府职责:

  (一)对本辖区的环境质量负责,采取措施改善环境质量。

  (二)根据国家制定的环境保护目标,制定实施本辖区的环境保护目标及有利于环境保护的经济、技术政策和措施,使生态环境修复和改善同经济建设、社会发展同步。目标完成情况应作为地方人民政府及其负责人政绩考核内容,并向同级人民代表大会或其常委会和上一级政府报告。

  (三)对具有代表性的各种类型的自然生态系统区域,珍稀、濒危的野生动植物自然分布区域,重要的水源涵养区域,具有重大科学文化价值的地质构造、著名溶洞和化石分布区、火山、温泉等自然遗迹,对重要人文遗迹、古树名木,应当采取措施加以保护,严禁破坏。

  (四)加强对农业环境的保护,防治土壤污染、土地沙化、盐渍化、贫瘠化、沼泽化、地面沉降,防止植被破坏、水土流失、水源枯竭、种源灭绝以及其它生态失调现象的发生和发展,推广植物病虫害的综合防治,合理利用化肥、农药及植物生长激素。

  (五)环境受到严重污染威胁居民健康和财产安全时,采取有效措施,解除或者减轻危害。

  (六)责令限期拆除饮用水源保护区内设置的排污口和违规工作建筑物。

  (七)关闭不符合国家产业政策或逾期未完成限期治理任务的污染企业。

  (八)对组织编制的土地利用有关规划和区域、流域的建设、开发利用规划,以及工业、农业、畜牧业、林业、能源、水利、交通、城市建设、旅游、自然资源开发的有关专项规划,应当进行环境影响评价。

  (九)组织实施生态市、县(市、区)创建优美乡镇、生态村,按计划完成创建任务。

  (十)建立并实施县(市、区)、乡(街、镇)流域水质交接断面责任制,具体办法另行制定。

  (十一)对保护和改善环境有显著成绩的单位和个人给予奖励。

  第七条 环境保护部门职责:

  (一)对本辖区的环境保护工作实施统一监督管理。

  (二)组织本行政区域环境预测、评价,制订环境保护规划和计划,并组织实施;会同有关部门组织实施政府制定的环境保护目标责任制。

  (三)负责大气、水体、土壤、噪声、固体废物、有毒化学品、放射性等污染防治法规和规章的实施。

  (四)负责召集有关部门代表和专家审查规划环境影响篇章(或说明、环境影响报告书),并提出审查意见;负责审批新建(包括技改、扩建)项目环境影响评价文件并组织开展项目竣工环保验收。

  (五)调查和处理本行政区域环境污染纠纷,协助地方政府处理环境污染事故。

  (六)负责环境监测、统计、信息工作;组织建设和管理环境监测网和环境信息网;组织环境质量监测和污染源监督性监测;指导环境监测站的计量认证和质量保证工作;组织编报环境质量报告书和环境年鉴,发布环境质量公报。

  (七)负责对辖区内企事业单位排污行为进行监督管理,将环境违法违规行为抄告工商、电力、金融等有关部门,并进行查处;组织开展环境保护执法检查活动;依法征收排污费。

  (八)按管理权限对辖区内放射性污染防治工作、放射性同位素及射线装置实行统一监督管理。

  (九)负责本行政区域内自然保护区的综合管理和生态环境的监督管理。

  (十)加强环境保护宣传教育,提高公民的环境保护意识,推动环境保护的社会监督,推动和指导民间环境保护组织的工作。

  (十一)组织环境保护科技发展、科学研究和技术示范工程;指导和推动环境保护产业发展;组织开展先进适用环保技术、设备的推广应用。

  (十二)开展国内和国际间环境保护的合作和交流。

  第八条 发展和改革部门职责:

  (一)负责将环境保护纳入国民经济和社会发展规划、计划。在组织编制、上报或者审批本《实施意见》第六条第(八)项规定的综合性规划和专项规划时,应当依法组织进行环境影响评价。

  (二)对审批权限内的建设项目,在审批和核准项目单位报送的项目可研报告或项目申请报告时,对未提供具有审批权限的环境保护部门出具的环境影响评价文件审批意见的,依法不予办理审批或核准;属于备案项目的,在项目备案后应告知项目业主向环保部门报批环境影响评价文件。

  (三)对属于市以上审批权限的建设项目,在审核阶段,应要求业主提供环保部门出具的环境影响评价文件的审批意见。

  第九条 教育部门职责:

  (一)将环境保护教育纳入中小学课程标准,并作为义务教育的重要内容,组织师生员工开展环境保护教育活动,普及环境保护知识,提高环境保护意识。

  (二)督促指导教育部门业务指导的各类院校,加强环境保护教学活动和环境保护社会实践活动。

  (三)负责督促指导各中小学创建“绿色学校”,并将创建“绿色学校”纳入学校建设总体规划。

  第十条 科学技术部门职责:

  (一)将环境保护科技进步纳入科学技术发展计划,并组织实施。

  (二)协调指导环境保护重大技术的研究、开发与示范。

  (三)支持科研机构和有关单位开展环境保护科学技术研究,推动环境保护科技进步。

  第十一条 经济贸易部门职责:

  (一)在组织编制、上报或者审批本《实施意见》第六条第(八)项规定的工业专项规划时,应当依法组织进行环境影响评价。

  (二)对审批权限内的建设项目,在审批和核准项目单位报送的项目可研报告或项目申请报告时,对未提供具有审批权限的环境保护部门出具的环境影响评价文件审批意见的,依法不予办理审批或核准;属于备案项目的,在项目备案后应告知项目业主向环保部门报批环境影响评价文件。

  (三)对属于市以上审批权限的建设项目,在审核阶段,应要求业主提供环保部门出具的环境影响评价文件的审批意见。

  (四)执行有利于环境保护的产业政策,指导督促工业企业落实环境保护相关制度,推动企业达标排放;组织推广应用新技术、新工艺、新产品,积极推进清洁生产和循环经济,指导和督促企业开展技术改造和污染治理。

  (五)研究解决企业发展与工业污染防治间协调发展的重大问题;严格执行国家产业政策,提请政府关闭、淘汰不符合国家产业政策的工艺、装备和产品;协助环保部门制定污染物排放总量控制计划,负责制定并监督落实产业结构调整措施。

  (六)负责督促相关水电站业主按要求安装最小下泄流量在线监控装置;根据环保部门提供的监控数据,按照分级管理原则,牵头会同有关部门督促相关水电站落实最小下泄流量要求。

  第十二条 公安部门职责:

  (一)按照国家法律法规的规定,负责商业、家庭、公共场所等社会生活噪声的监督管理,对违反规定使用喇叭、警报器的行为依法实施管理。

  (二)负责危险化学品的公共安全管理。负责发放剧毒化学品购买凭证和准购证、核发剧毒化学品公路运输通行证,对危险化学品道路运输安全实施监督检查。

  (三)负责放射性物品运输安全的有关监督管理工作,负责丢失、被盗放射源的立案侦查和追缴,参与放射源的放射性污染事故应急工作。

  (四)协助环境保护部门对机动车尾气污染进行监督管理。

  (五)依法查处涉及环境保护的刑事犯罪案件和治安管理案件。

  (六)协助有关部门开展环境保护宣传教育,负责对专职消防队、自愿消防队等消防组织进行业务指导。

  第十三条 监察部门职责:

  (一)负责对下一级人民政府、本级政府有关部门及其工作人员履行环境保护职责的监督。

  (二)依法依规查处环境保护工作中的违纪违法行为;对构成犯罪的,及时移送司法机关。

  (三)会同环保部门对上级和本级政府部署的重大环保工作进行督查和考核。

  第十四条 民政部门职责:

  (一)协助做好环境事件的相关善后工作。

  (二)负责督促指导福利企业及假肢科研和生产企业落实环境保护工作。

  (三)协助组织社区开展“绿色社区”创建活动,组织社区开展环境保护活动,普及环境保护知识,提高环境保护意识。

  第十五条 司法行政部门职责:

  (一)将环境保护法律、法规纳入公民普法的重要内容,会同有关部门宣传普及有关环境保护法律、法规知识;监督、指导律师、公证员、基层法律服务工作者为生产经营单位提供环境保护法律服务。

  (二)监督监狱、劳教单位贯彻执行环境保护法律、法规和标准,加强环境保护日常监管,防止环境污染事故发生。

  第十六条 财政部门职责:

  (一)负责编制同级政府年度环境保护投入预算;统筹安排环境保护及其监督管理所需的费用。

  (二)按照现行事权、财权划分原则,根据环境保护工作需要,每年安排资金用于环境保护体系建设;加大对环境保护的支持,调整支出结构,加大对环境保护的投入。

  (三)组织研究和实施有利于环境保护的财政政策,将环境保护指标完成情况作为财政有关资金分配的重要依据。

  第十七条 劳动和社会保障部门职责:

  组织开展环境保护职业技能上岗培训和职业教育。将环境保护污染治理设施运营管理及操作工列入技术工种范围,并对该工种持证上岗情况实施劳动保障监察。

  第十八条 国土资源部门职责:

  (一)组织编制市级土地利用总体规划和矿产资源总体规划,应当在编制过程中进行环境影响评价,并向审批该专项规划的机关提出环境影响评价文件和书面审查意见。

  (二)对新设置的采矿权、探矿权,在审核阶段,应要求采矿权、探矿权申请人提交经环保部门审批同意的开采矿产资源环境影响评价报告文件。

  (三)负责组织划定禁止采矿区;负责对矿山地质环境的治理恢复实施监督管理;落实矿山地质保证金制度,负责将查处的无证非法开采矿山及达不到最小开采规模的矿山提请当地人民政府组织关闭。

  第十九条 城乡建设部门职责:

  (一)协助把好建筑工程新建项目环保审批和验收关;对建筑工程建设项目环评文件未经批准、环保设施未验收合格的,依法不得办理工程竣工验收备案手续。

  (二)负责建筑工地的施工扬尘污染防治工作。

  (三)负责城市生活垃圾清扫、收集、贮存、运输和处置的监督管理工作;负责废弃食用油脂等餐厨垃圾收集、运输、处置的监督管理;负责沿街(路)或在垃圾容器内焚烧废弃物的监督管理;负责防止道路清扫过程中产生的二次扬尘污染。

  (四)协助环保部门制定污染物排放总量控制计划,负责制定并监督落实本行政区域内的城镇污水、垃圾处理设施建设规划和城镇生活污染物排放总量控制措施;负责对已建成污水、垃圾处理设施运行的监管;推进城镇雨污分流工程,改造城镇污水收集系统,提高污水收集率。

  (五)协助环保部门对建成区内扬尘污染、焚烧垃圾等废旧物品烟尘污染和燃煤烟尘污染进行监督管理。

  (六)负责督促城镇自来水厂提升水处理工艺,加强水厂出水水质监控;负责督促供水部门对环境违法企业依法采取限水、停水、断水等措施。

  (七)负责督促创建“绿色社区”工作,并对已经验收的“绿色社区”进行监督管理。

  第二十条 城乡规划部门职责:

  (一)负责乡(镇)、村生活垃圾清扫、收集、贮存、运输和处置的监督管理工作。

  (二)组织编制城市娱乐业、餐饮业布局规划。

  第二十一条 交通运输部门职责:

  (一)负责在交通专项规划上报或审批前,按照有关法律、法规组织环境影响评价,并向审批该专项规划的机关提出环境影响评价文件和书面审查意见。

  (二)负责监督落实高速公路两侧声障屏或其他噪声污染防治措施的建设。

  (三)负责与水源保护区相邻事故多发公路路段防撞、污水收集等防护措施的监督落实。

  (四)依法对机动车污染大气实施监督管理。

  (五)负责危险化学品公路、水路运输单位及其运输工具的安全管理,对危险化学品水路运输安全实施监督,防治危险化学品污染环境。

  第二十二条 农业部门职责:

  (一)对基本农田环境污染防治进行科学研究、技术推广、宣传培训及监督管理;推广使用合理农业技术,引导农民科学施肥、安全使用农药,推广生态农业技术,防止植被破坏和土壤污染。

  (二)组织开展农业环境监测和生态农业建设工作,指导农业生产对农业生态环境造成污染、破坏的预防和治理。

  第二十三条 畜牧兽医水产部门职责

  (一)负责督促各地制(修)定畜禽养殖业发展和污染治理规划,协助地方人民政府依法划定禁养区、禁建区(限养区);协助环保部门制定污染物排放总量控制计划。

  (二)负责制定并监督落实畜禽养殖业污染排放总量控制措施,实施畜禽养殖污染整治。负责重大动物疫病防控工作,负责监督指导货主做好染疫动物、病死或死因不明动物尸体无害化处理工作。

  (三)负责水产养殖区的环境整治。

  (四)负责制定并监督落实水产养殖业污染排放总量控制措施;督促养殖生产者科学确定养殖密度,合理投饵、施肥、使用药物;监督落实规定区域网箱养殖的取缔,依法查处违规水产养殖行为;负责对渔业污染水域事件进行调查处理。

  第二十四条 林业部门职责:

  (一)依法对森林资源的保护实施监督管理。

  (二)负责对本行政区域内陆生野生动物和植物保护实施监督管理。

  (三)负责对其主管的自然保护区进行保护和监督管理;依法对湿地的保护实施监督管理。

  (四)负责督促各地政府制订流域沿江两岸造林绿化规划,监督落实生态公益林建设和保护;负责沿岸防护林维护和建设;实行采伐限额制度,采伐后应及时更新抚育。

  第二十五条 水利部门职责:

  (一)负责在水利资源开发专项规划上报或审批前,按照有关法律、法规组织环境影响评价,并向审批该专项规划的机关提出环境影响评价文件和书面审查意见。

  (二)负责划定禁采砂区、查处河道违法采砂行为;协助环保部门加强对河道排污口及饮用水源保护区违规排污口的监督管理;对河道、库区上漂浮物清理提出方案并督促有关单位予以落实。

  (三)合理调度水资源,确保水源水量要求和下游生态用水需要;牵头实施汛期放水冲污;指导各水电站安装最小下泄流量在线监测设备。

  (四)负责对出现藻类暴发或其他污染隐患的流域或水电站实施消库放水。

  (五)负责对水电站的合理性进行审查与处理,落实未经水利、国土、环保、林业、工商等部门审批的水电站停止建设和运营,限期整改。

  (六)依法实施水土保持监督管理。

  第二十六条 对外贸易经济合作部门职责:

  (一)在开发区扩区、设立上报审批时,负责向审批机关提出规划环境影响评价文件和书面审核意见。

  (二)负责指导督促开发区(工业园区)落实污染集中处理设施的规划、建设及运行管理工作,负责指导督促区内企业落实环境保护工作。

  (三)负责招商引资和投资促进工作中对外资的产业引导,依据环保部门对项目的审核意见实施项目准入审查;配合环保部门监督外商投资企业执行环境保护法律法规的情况,并协调解决有关环境保护问题。

  (四)执行国家制定公布的禁止进口、限制进口和自动许可进口的固体废物目录,负责协助环保、口岸等部门对列入限制进口目录的固体废物进行审查许可。

  第二十七条 文化部门职责:

  (一)协助环保部门对文化娱乐场所污染排放进行监督检查。

  (二)按照《娱乐场所管理条例》的规定,严格监管文化娱乐场所营业时间,对超时营业行为进行查处。

  (三)在审批娱乐场所时征求规划部门意见。

  第二十八条 卫生部门职责:

  (一)协助环保部门对医疗卫生机构的医疗废物收集、运送、贮存、处置活动中的环境污染防治工作,以及医疗废水处理工作实施监督管理。

  (二)参与人体铅等重金属含量超标事件的调查,负责流行病学调查,组织医疗卫生机构对患者进行诊疗。

  (三)配合环保部门做好医疗卫生机构的核与辐射环境管理。负责放射源的职业病危害评价管理工作;负责放射源诊疗技术和医用辐射机构的准入管理;参与放射源的放射性污染事故应急工作;负责放射源的放射性污染事故的医疗应急。

  (四)组织对市政水厂出厂水水质进行卫生监督监测。

  第二十九条 国有资产监督管理机构职责:

  (一)履行国有资产出资人职责,督促所出资企业贯彻落实环境保护法律、法规,建立健全环境保护责任制。

  (二)督促所出资企业落实环境保护工作,负责将环境保护工作作为管理绩效考核的重要内容,纳入企业负责人经营业绩考核之中,并与企业负责人的酬薪管理相挂钩。

  (三)参与或协助开展对所出资企业环境保护工作的检查、督查,督促企业认真落实环境保护、污染治理的各项措施。

  第三十条 公务员管理部门职责:

  将环境保护法律、法规纳入行政机关、事业单位工作人员普法教育的重要内容和培训学习计划,并指导实施;将环境保护责任履行情况作为行政机关、事业单位工作人员奖惩、考核的重要内容。

  第三十一条 工商行政管理部门职责:

  (一)严把主体准入关。企业(含个体工商户)的经营范围中有属于法律、行政法规、国务院决定或者地方性法规规定,在登记前须经环境影响评价、办理环保审批手续的项目的,应当凭环保审批文件或许可证件办理营业执照。

  (二)对因违反环保法律法规被责令停业、关闭的各类市场主体,根据环保部门的抄告,依法责令其办理变更、注销登记手续;拒不办理的,依法吊销其营业执照。

  (三)负责对销售和经营不可降解的一次性发泡塑料餐具、塑料袋、含磷洗涤用品等违法行为的查处。

  (四)依法查处在集贸市场销售野生保护动物的违法行为。

  (五)在审批娱乐业场所、餐饮业时,应先征求规划部门意见。

  (六)配合有关部门依法查处无证经营行为。

  第三十二条 质量技术监督部门职责:

  (一)负责环境监测设备、仪器、仪表等的计量检定工作。

  (二)负责机动车安全技术检验单位的资质认定工作,配合环保部门做好对机动车尾气检测的监督管理工作。

  (三)负责对生产领域的环保产品实施监督。

  (四)对危险化学品包装物、容器的产品质量实施监督。

  第三十三条 广播电视部门职责:

  (一)组织落实政府及环保委确定的环境保护宣传任务。

  (二)组织广播电台、电视台等新闻媒体配合政府有关部门共同开展环境保护宣传教育和重大宣传活动。

  (三)负责督促广播电台、电视台落实辐射设施的污染防治措施。

  第三十四条 安全生产监督管理部门职责:

  (一)负责危险化学物品生产、经营单位的安全生产综合监督管理。

  (二)负责依法查处危险化学品生产企业违反安全生产法律法规的行为,防范生产安全事故。

  (三)负责职责范围内矿山尾矿库安全生产相关监督管理工作。

  第三十五条 统计部门职责:

  (一)负责将环境保护有关数据纳入国民经济和社会发展统计指标体系,并定期公布。

  (二)负责提供环境保护指标体系中所需要的能源、国民经济统计指标,为考核提供依据。

  (三)负责公众对环境满意度的调查统计。

  第三十六条 旅游部门职责:

  (一)协助做好旅游资源开发利用和保护工作中的环境保护监督管理工作,负责A级旅游景区环境整治。

  (二)负责在旅游推介等活动中,大力宣传环境保护工作。

  第三十七条 物价部门职责:

  负责拟定差别电价政策、城镇污水垃圾处理收费政策,以及有利于环境保护的价格政策。

  第三十八条 信息化部门职责:

  负责对未依法进行环境影响评价的新、扩、改建电磁辐射项目,不予发放电台(站)执照。

  第三十九条 政府新闻部门职责:

  (一)负责组织指导有关环境保护方面的新闻发布工作,及时发布环境保护方面的重大政策和重大情况,正确引导舆论导向。

  (二)负责将环境保护宣传纳入社会公益性宣传范畴,配合党委宣传部门协调省属新闻单位开展环境保护宣传教育和重大宣传活动。

  第四十条 政府法制部门职责:

  (一)负责依法审查修改有关环境保护方面的规范性文件。

  (二)负责对有关部门报送政府审议的文件中涉及环境保护方面的内容进行合法性审核。

  (三)协同有关部门开展环境保护执法检查,依法办理环境保护监督管理部门的行政复议案件。

  第四十一条 气象部门职责:

  负责重大灾害性天气的监测、预报、警报工作,及时发布天气预警、预报信息,及时提供重大环境事件的气象信息。

  第四十二条 地震部门职责:

  负责地震灾害预防管理工作,及时提供震情信息,会同环保部门防范地震次生灾害导致的环境污染和生态破坏事故。

  第四十三条 通信管理部门职责:

  (一)组织电信运营业为环境事件应急救援提供通信保障。

  (二)负责督促通信企业贯彻落实环境保护法律法规,参与或者组织通信运营企业积极采取环境保护技术和节能减排措施,落实环境保护责任。

  (三)负责督促通信业务部门落实基站等辐射设施的污染防治措施。

  第四十四条 铁路部门职责:

  (一)负责铁路机车驶经或进入城市市区、疗养区时声响装置噪声污染防治工作。

  (二)负责会同地方人民政府及其有关部门制定穿越城市居民区、文教区的铁路环境噪声污染的规划,并采取有效措施,防止和减轻环境噪声污染;负责防止铁路机车产生的废水、废气、固体废弃物污染。

  第四十五条 民航部门职责:

  负责采取有效措施,减轻民用航空器起飞、降落环境噪声污染;负责防止民用航空器产生的废水、废气、固体废弃物污染。

  第四十六条 银行业管理部门职责:

  (一)督促各银行业金融机构对未通过环评审批或者环保设施验收的项目,不得新增任何形式的授信支持。

  (二)督促各银行业金融机构在审查企业流动资金贷款申请时,应根据环保部门提供的相关信息,加强授信管理,对有环境违法行为的企业应严格控制贷款。

  (三)监督各银行业金融机构将企业环保守法情况作为授信审查条件,严格审批、严格管理。

  第四十七条 保险监督管理部门职责:

  (一)加强对保险机构开展环境污染责任保险工作的指导、监督和管理。

  (二)监督保险机构认真履行保险合同,建立健全保险理赔服务标准,为投保企业提供可靠的保障。

  第四十八条 电力监管机构职责:

  (一)负责监督供电企业严格执行可再生能源上网电价、差别电价等节能减排电价政策。

  (二)负责监督供电企业严格执行政府有关部门做出的对淘汰、关停企业和环境违法企业依法采取停、限电措施的决定。

  (三)负责依法依规对违规发电企业采取吊销发电上网许可等措施。

  (四)负责督促输变电企业落实输变电工程电磁辐射污染防治措施。

  第四十九条 海关部门职责:

  负责对进境固体废物、越境转移危险废物实施监督管理。

  第五十条 检验检疫部门职责:

  (一)负责进口固体废物的检验检疫及监督管理工作。

  (二)负责对进口固体废物国内收货人的监督管理。

  第五十一条 各县(市、区)有关部门与市有关部门职责不对应的,由各县(市、区)政府根据各地实际做出界定。

  三、责任落实保障措施

  第五十二条 市级人民政府应当向市直有关部门和下一级人民政府下达环境保护目标责任,并逐级分解、层层落实,建立环境保护责任考核制度和考核指标体系,确保实现年度环境保护工作目标。

  建立健全市、县(市、区)、乡(镇)环境管理体系。市、县(市、区)成立环境保护委员会。

  各县(市、区)人民政府和市直有关部门应当认真贯彻落实政府及环委会做出的环境保护工作部署,定期向上级政府和本级环委会报告环境保护工作情况,主要负责人每年应提交环境保护工作履职报告。环委会对本级人民政府有关部门主要负责人和下一级政府主要负责人的环境保护工作履职报告进行点评并通报。

  第五十三条 各级人民政府及有关部门应当建立重点污染源监控制度,建立重点污染源数据库,对存在重大环境污染隐患的生产经营单位进行监督检查,并根据重点污染源数据库信息,定期组织专家对重点污染源的状况进行综合分析、评估,督促生产经营单位采取有效的防范和监控措施。

  第五十四条 各级人民政府及有关部门应当建立环境污染隐患排查治理监督检查制度,加强对生产经营单位环境污染隐患排查治理情况的监督检查。对重大环境污染隐患实施挂牌督办,有关部门应当下达整改指令,督促生产经营单位制定整改方案,明确责任领导、整改措施、整改资金、整改负责人、整改期限和应急预案,并由同级人民政府在当地主要媒体公布,接受社会监督。对拒不执行环境污染隐患整改指令或整改后仍达不到要求的,有关部门应当依法及时采取措施,进行查处。对有突出环境问题的乡(镇)实行单列管理,限期解决突出环境问题。单列期间,乡(镇)主要领导不得调动,不得评先评优。连续两年突出环境问题没有解决的,乡(镇)主要负责人要引咎辞职。

  有关部门应当每半年将本行政区域重大环境隐患的排查治理情况和统计分析表报送本级环委会,各级环委会要逐级报至省环委会备案。环委会对重大环境隐患排查治理情况进行综合监督检查。

  第五十五条 有关部门应当建立环境污染隐患和环境保护违法行为举报受理和查处制度,公开举报电话、电子邮箱或其他举报方式,并对收到的举报进行登记。对受理的举报事项,应当组织调查核实,并按规定处理。有关部门应当为举报者保密。举报事项经查证属实的,应当对举报者给予奖励。

  第五十六条 地方各级人民政府及有关部门应当加强环境事件应急救援队伍建设,根据环境事件等级及时启动相应的应急预案,组织开展环境事件应急工作,协调解决事件应急、善后处理中遇到的重大问题,及时向上级人民政府及负有环境保护监督管理职责的部门报告事件应急救援进展情况。对不按照规定报告或者在报告中弄虚作假,或者不依法采取必要应急措施或者拖延、推诿采取应急措施,致使事件扩大或者延误事件处理的,对直接责任人员给予警告、记过或者记大过处分;情节较重的,给予降级或者撤职处分;情节严重的,给予开除处分。

  第五十七条 负有环境保护监督管理职责的部门在履行环境保护监督管理职责过程中,应当互相配合。发现存在不属于本机关管辖的环境污染事故隐患或者环境违法行为的,应当及时移送有管辖权的部门处理,并形成书面记录备查,接受移送的部门应当及时进行处理。需要联合执法的,应当组织联合执法,有关部门或单位应当积极配合。

  第五十八条 上级人民政府应当对本级人民政府有关部门和下一级人民政府环境保护责任目标落实情况进行半年跟踪落实、年终考核,并予以通报。对认真履行职责、工作成绩显著的给予表彰奖励。

  第五十九条 各级人民政府应当对每季度环境保护情况进行综合分析。对环境事故多发、环境保护工作没有及时部署落实、重大环境隐患没有在限期内整改到位、重大环境违法行为没有依法进行查处、环境事故责任追究不落实的地区或行业领域,由上一级人民政府进行通报,通报抄送政府及有关部门主要负责人。必要时由上级人民政府或委托本级环委会对有关部门或下一级政府主要负责人进行约谈。造成环境污染事故的,对直接责任人员,给予警告、记过或者记大过处分;情节较重的,给予降级或者撤职处分;情节严重的,给予开除处分。

  第六十条 各级人民政府及有关部门落实环境保护监督管理责任的情况应当纳入领导干部年度政绩考核的重要内容,作为对领导干部、领导班子领导能力的评价依据及提拔和使用干部的重要标准。没有完成年度环境保护工作目标,或发生环境事故造成恶劣影响的,对相关领导和责任人员实行行政问责,并在环境保护评先评优中实行“一票否决”。

  各级人民政府及有关部门未按本规定落实环境保护监督管理责任,造成严重后果、影响恶劣的,依据有关法律、法规对有关人员进行责任追究。一年内发生一起致使公私财产损失30万元以上;致使1人以上死亡、3人以上重伤、10人以上轻伤,或者1人以上重伤并且5人以上轻伤事故的,县级人民政府应于事故发生后的30个工作日内向设区市人民政府做出书面检查报告。

  四、有关事项

  第六十一条 本《实施意见》所称主要负责人,系指政府及有关部门的正职负责人,以及主持工作、代行正职职能的副职负责人。

  本《实施意见》所称分管负责人,是指根据“一岗双责”负责某一方面工作的副职负责人。

  第六十二条 本《实施意见》自公布之日起施行。